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Abstract 
 
There is a threat that a terrorist or terrorist organization will use access to the US 
food supply to kill or sicken Americans by contaminating imported food products from 
Mexico.  The food that Americans eat is coming more and more often from foreign 
countries such as Mexico.  Foodborne diseases infect nearly fifty million people in the 
US each year, resulting in over three thousand deaths.  There are many terrorist 
organizations that would like to deliberately contaminate American food.  Drug cartels 
and terrorist organizations currently operate in Mexico, one of the leading food importers 
into the US.  The purpose of this research was to determine what actions should be taken 
in response to the threat of biological terrorism through deliberately-contaminated food 
supplied from Mexico. 
While Americans enjoy the safest and most abundant food supply in the world, 
this thesis made several recommendations.  First, laboratories and public health officers 
should continue to increase their ability to detect and identify foodborne outbreaks.  
Second, consumers who become sickened by foodborne pathogens should report their 
sickness to either the local hospital or to the local health department even if they choose 
to treat the sickness at home.  Third, the US should increase the production of food that 
Americans eat with the goal of producing a self sufficient food supply.  Fourth, 
consumers should be better informed on food safety issues to minimize the effects of 
bioterrorism. 
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COMBATING BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM FROM IMPORTED FOOD  
 
I.  Introduction 
General Issue 
Foreign Food   
The food that Americans eat is coming more and more often from foreign 
countries.  The value of US imports of agricultural products rose from $10.491 billion in 
1976 to $73.865 billion in 2010 (ERS, 2010b; Appendix A).  See Figure 1.  About 80% 
of seafood, 50% of fruits, and 50% of nuts are now imported (Buckley, 2010).  With a 
workforce willing to work for less pay, some foreign countries, such as Mexico and 
China, can produce foods cheaper abroad than we can in the US.  Also, some food 
products, such as cocoa beans for chocolate production, cannot be grown in the US 
(Jerardo, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 1.  Value of US Agricultural Imports by Year (ERS, 2011) 
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Foodborne Pathogens   
“Food carries with it the risk of foodborne illness” (Buckley, 2010:9).  The 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) identified and categorized biological 
agents, including several foodborne pathogens, as possible agents that could be used for 
bioterrorism (CDC, “Bioterrorism”, 2010d).  The Category A agents, or those agents 
assigned a higher priority due to their high mortality rates, include Bacillus anthracis, 
which causes anthrax, and Clostridium botulinum, which causes botulism.  For example, 
the oral lethal dose for botulinum toxin is only 70 micrograms (Arnon, et al., 2001; 
AAOS, 2005:1117).  While these two biological organisms are more dangerous if used, 
most foodborne pathogens are classified as Category B agents because they would cause 
moderate morbidity and low mortality rates.  These agents include Salmonella species, 
Escherichia. coli O157:H7, and Shigella dysenteriae.  These organisms have the 
capability to kill or sicken those that are infected by them. 
In January 2011, the CDC released new estimates on the effects of foodborne 
diseases.  The CDC estimates that, each year, about 47.8 million people, which is about 
one in six US citizens, becomes sick from foodborne diseases.  Of those, nearly 128,000 
people become hospitalized with over 3,000 deaths.  Of the 47.8 million annual illnesses, 
31 known foodborne pathogens cause over 9 million illnesses.  The remaining 38 million 
illnesses, or 80 percent of the total illnesses, result from agents that cannot be determined 
because there is not enough data to specify an agent or that the agent has not been 
discovered or recognized as a foodborne pathogen (Scallan, et al., 2011; Appendix B).  
The CDC determined that Salmonella was the leading cause of hospitalizations (35 
percent) and deaths (28 percent) of the known foodborne pathogens.  The seven most 
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influential pathogens are Salmonella, norovirus, Campylobacter, Toxoplasma, E. coli 
O157, Listeria, and Clostridium perfringens and are responsible for about 90 percent of 
the estimated illnesses, hospitalizations, and deaths.  Norovirus causes 5.5 million, or 58 
percent, of the foodborne illnesses (Scallan, et al., 2011; Appendix C). 
Terrorism   
There are many enemies of the US that would like to cause terrorism within the 
country.  The Secretary of State has determined that four nations, Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and 
Syria, are state sponsors of terrorism (DOS, 2009).  North Korea was a member of 
President George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” with Libya included on a subsequent list 
named “Beyond the Axis of Evil.”  Both were previously on the list of nations sponsoring 
terrorism.  China, Russia, and Venezuela might also enjoy hurting the US.  Al Qaeda and 
many other terrorist organizations (DOS, 2010b; Appendix D) have also targeted 
Americans in the past.  In fact, the Washington Times reported that the terrorist group 
Hezbollah, the same organization that killed 241 American servicemen with a truck bomb 
at a Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 (CDI, 2010), is currently operating in Mexico 
(Washington Times, 2009).   
Food Terrorism Defined   
Many sources use the definition for food terrorism used by the World Health 
Organization, or WHO: 
“an act or threat of deliberate contamination of food for human consumption with 
biological, chemical and physical agents or radionuclear materials for the purpose 
of causing injury or death to civilian populations and/or disrupting social, 
economic or political stability.  The biological agents referred to are 
communicable infectious or non-infectious pathogenic microorganisms, including 
viruses, bacteria and parasites” (WHO, 2008:4). 
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Mexico   
Mexico is an important country to the US, perhaps the most important and the 
most influential.  Mexico’s relationship with the US has a direct impact on the lives and 
livelihoods of millions of Americans in the form of trade, homeland security, drug 
control, or migration.  This becomes apparent when one realizes that nearly one million 
people and one billion dollars worth of commerce cross the US-Mexico border daily.  
One million Americans live in Mexico with over 18,000 companies with US investment 
there (which is more than 40% of all foreign direct investment in Mexico).  Local and 
state governments on both sides of the 2,000-mile border are required to interact closely 
to properly serve their citizens.  To combat terrorism and control the flow of illegal drugs 
into the US, it is critical to have a strong partnership with Mexico (Bureau of Western 
Hemispheric Affairs, 2010b). 
Any discussion about Mexican operations must include a discussion about 
Mexican drug cartels.  Within Mexico, drug cartels depend upon American consumers for 
their financial support.  The cartels could violently respond to any threat to their 
livelihood.  Mexican drug cartels have responded to increased pressure on their activities 
with increased and unprecedented levels of hostility aimed at both the government’s 
security forces and each other.  Narcotics-related violence killed over 8,000 people in 
2009, most in states along the US border.  More than 400 of Mexico’s security forces 
members were killed.  Almost 23,000 people have died in the war on drugs since 
Mexican President Calderon took office in December 2006 (Bureau of Western 
Hemispheric Affairs, 2010b).   
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Problem Statement 
These drug cartels, or any of these nations or organizations mentioned above, 
could commit a biological attack on the US.  While the US imports food from many 
countries, this study is limited to that food which is imported from Mexico.  There is a 
threat that a terrorist or terrorist organization will use access to the US food supply to kill 
or sicken Americans by contaminating imported food products from Mexico.  What 
actions should be taken in response to the threat of biological terrorism through 
deliberately-contaminated food supplied from Mexico? 
Research Objective 
With the threat that a terrorist or terrorist organization will use access to the food 
supply into the US to kill or sicken Americans by contaminating imported food products 
from Mexico, this study sought to determine which actions should be taken in response to 
the threat of biological terrorism through deliberately-contaminated food supplied from 
Mexico. 
Investigative Questions 
To answer the research objective, this study answered the following investigative 
questions: 
What pathogens are available for use in a foodborne bioterrorism attack? 
Which terrorist organizations could execute this bioterrorist attack? 
What food, and how much, does Mexico export into the US? 
How do the Mexican farmers transport their food into the US? 
Where along the food production process could a terrorist contaminate the food 
with foodborne pathogens? 
What are the effects that a foodborne bioterrorism attack could cause? 
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Methodology 
Much of the research for this study was conducted by a literature review.  There 
exists much literature, both printed and online, that addressed and answered the 
investigative questions.  Some of this information came from departments and agencies 
under the federal, state, or other governments, while other information came from 
professional organizations and other sources.  For information not found in published 
documents, organizations or experts in that particular field were contacted directly. 
World Health Organization 
When representatives from around the world met in 1945 to form the United 
Nations, or UN, one of the items they discussed was the creation of a “global health 
organization” (WHO, 2010a). Three years later, on 7 April 1948, the UN established the 
World Health Organization, or WHO.  “WHO is the directing and coordinating authority 
for health within the United Nations system” (WHO, 2010a), similar to a global 
Department of Health and Human Services.  The US and Mexico are each members of 
both the UN and WHO.  The WHO addresses health issues on a global scale and is a 
valuable source of information on disease outbreaks throughout the world and 
international plans and legislation. 
In 2002, WHO addressed the threat of contaminated food used for bioterrorism 
resulting in their publication “Terrorist Threats to Food.”  WHO revised this publication 
in May 2008 under the same title.  In this, WHO provides guidance to UN members on 
how to respond to the threat of terrorism using their food supply (WHO, 2008). 
WHO believes in “taking sensible precautions, coupled with establishing and 
strengthening surveillance and response capacity” (WHO, 2008:Executive Summary) to 
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fight food terrorism.  The WHO’s plan uses two main strategies: prevention and 
response.  This plan is discussed in this study. 
Federal Government 
The executive branch of the federal government consists of fifteen executive 
departments in addition to other independent agencies, boards, commissions, and 
committees (USA, 2010).  These departments and agencies manage specific areas of 
national and international affairs, enforce federal laws, and otherwise carry out the 
policies of the President of the US.  Therefore, these federal departments and agencies are 
an important source of information regarding bioterrorism and other associated issues.  
The following lists and describes several of these organizations. 
Department of Homeland Security   
President George W. Bush created the Office of Homeland Security eleven days 
following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001.  This office was given the 
responsibility to coordinate and direct a comprehensive national strategy to keep America 
safe from terrorism and to be able to effectively respond to any future terrorist attack.  In 
the summer of 2002, Congress introduced a bill to establish the Department of Homeland 
Security, or DHS.  The Federal Emergency Management Agency, or FEMA, the Customs 
Service, the Border Patrol, and the US Coast Guard became part of this new department 
(Borja, 2008).  DHS has the mission of keeping America safe from terrorism, including 
foodborne bioterrorism attacks, and has oversight over aviation, border security, cyber 
security, and emergency response (DHS, 2010). 
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Department of Health and Human Services   
The Department of Health and Human Services, or HHS, is the federal 
government’s primary agency for protecting the health of all Americans and for 
providing important human health services in the event of a national emergency, 
including a foodborne bioterrorism attack (HHS, 2010a).  HHS oversees several 
important organizations listed and described below. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  The Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, or CDC, is an agency within HHS that possesses the expertise, 
information, and tools to help people protect their health.  They promote health and the 
prevention of disease, injury, and disability, and are instrumental in the preparation for 
health threats.  The CDC monitors health, detects and investigates health issues, conducts 
research to enhance prevention, develops public health policy, implements prevention 
strategies, promotes healthy behavior, and provides health leadership and training (CDC, 
“About CDC”, 2010a).  The CDC provides information on foodborne bioterrorism agents 
and diseases on its website and in two of its periodicals.  The CDC publishes monthly the 
peer-reviewed journal Emerging Infectious Diseases which is the third most circulated 
infectious disease journal with 17,000 subscribers in more than 100 countries (CDC, 
“About Emerging”, 2010b).  The CDC also publishes the Morbidity and Mortality 
Weekly Report (MMWR) which is the CDC’s “primary vehicle for scientific publication 
of timely, reliable, authoritative, accurate, objective, and useful public health information 
and recommendations” (CDC, “About the”, 2010c).  The CDC is not a regulatory agency. 
Food and Drug Administration.  The Food and Drug Administration, or 
FDA, has the responsibility to protect public health and has regulatory oversight over the 
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safety and security of human and animal drugs, biological products, medical devices, 
certain parts of the nation’s food supply, and other related activities.  The FDA is 
responsible to advance the use of innovations that make food and medicines safer, more 
effective, and cheaper.  The FDA also provides the public information on food and 
medicine in an effort to improve public health (FDA, 2010). 
National Institutes of Health.  The National Institutes of Health, or NIH, 
is America’s medical research agency and the world’s largest source of medical research 
funding.  The NIH consists of 27 institutes and centers, each with their own specific 
research area.  The NIH funds more than 300,000 researchers at over 3,000 universities 
and research institutions with 6,000 scientists of their own (NIH, 2010). 
Department of State   
The Department of State, or DOS, is the federal government’s executive 
department for international relations and executes the federal government’s diplomatic 
missions abroad while implementing US foreign policy.  DOS would interact with a 
foreign country, such as Mexico, for issues that cross international borders.  This 
interaction includes coordination of foreign aid in the event of a national-level disaster.  
DOS also determines which nations are listed as State Sponsors of Terrorism and which 
organizations are categorized as Terrorist Organizations (DOS, 2010a). 
Department of Agriculture   
The US Department of Agriculture, or USDA, is the federal government’s 
executive department for developing and executing federal government policy relating to 
farming, agriculture, and food.  The USDA also promotes agricultural production and 
trade and food safety (USDA, 2010a). 
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Foreign Agricultural Service.  The mission of the Foreign Agricultural 
Service, or FAS, is to gain access of US agricultural products into foreign markets.  FAS 
gathers information on agricultural imports and exports and is a source of information on 
Mexican agriculture and trade (USDA, 2010b). 
Economic Research Service.  Within the USDA, the Economic Research 
Service, or ERS, conducts social science research, including socioeconomic indicators 
and market analysis.  ERS provides the research analysis and results, briefings, and 
reports to policymakers and their staffs and is a more detailed source for information on 
US and Mexican agriculture and trade (USDA, 2010b).  ERS publishes their economic 
information, research, and analysis in their magazine Amber Waves four times a year 
(ERS, 2010a). 
Department of Defense   
The Department of Defense, or DoD, provides the military forces required to fight 
and win our nation’s wars to protect the security and sovereignty of the US (DoD, 2011).  
The DoD has built the capability to protect servicemembers and expanded that capability 
to assist the nation.  Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response Systems 
(GEIS) Operations contributes to surveillance and detection of, and response to emerging 
infections.  This includes respiratory infections, gastrointestinal infections, febrile illness 
syndromes, antimicrobial resistance, and sexually transmitted infections (AFHSC, 2011). 
US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases.  The 
mission of the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, or 
USAMRIID, is to research biological threats, leading to medical solutions, to protect 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and all other military service members.  It is the 
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primary medical research laboratory for the US Biological Defense Research Program.  It 
is the only laboratory in the DoD that is equipped to safety study hazardous infectious 
agents that need the maximum containment at biosafety level 4 (USAMARIID, 2010a).  
USAMRIID supports the CDC and the WHO to investigate emerging diseases and 
supports HHS, DHS, and other federal agencies to develop medical countermeasures to 
protect US citizens (USAMARIID, 2010b). 
National Response Framework   
The National Response Framework, or NRF, outlines how the US responds to 
disasters and emergencies, including acts of bioterrorism.  Included in the document are 
the guiding principles, roles, and organizational structure that outline how local, state, 
and the federal governments, private sector, and non-governmental organizations 
respond.  The NRF also covers planning and additional resources an organization may 
require to be prepared for an emergency response.  The NRF is a framework, not a plan, 
that may be adapted to the specific situation at hand and to the size of the incident.  The 
NRF defines “response” as the “immediate actions to save lives, protect property and the 
environment, and meet basic human needs” (FEMA, 2008:1).  “Response” also includes 
executing plans and completing actions to help short-term recovery. 
New Federal Legislation   
The 111th US Congress, serving from 2009 to 2010, passed 28 notable acts of 
federal legislation, which is substantially more than in recent memory (Library of 
Congress, 2010).  One of these bills being considered at the time of this study is the FDA 
Food Safety Modernization Act.  This Act sets out to improve the safety of the US food 
supply by providing new powers and resources to the FDA.  (Associated Press, 2010; 
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Library of Congress, 2010).  The results of this legislation and its impact were considered 
in this study. 
State of Ohio 
Of the fifty states that could have been used for this study, the state of Ohio 
represents a typical US state and is an adequate example of a state that would receive 
food from Mexico.  Ohio has 11.5 million people, which is not as large as California, 
Texas, New York, or Florida, each with over 18 million residents, or as small as 
Montana, Delaware, North and South Dakota, Vermont, or Wyoming, each with less than 
one million residents (Census, 2010).  Ohio consists of 44,825 square miles, which is not 
as large as the giant states of Texas, California, Montana, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, 
and Colorado, each with over 100,000 square miles, but not as small as Vermont, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, Connecticut, Delaware, and Rhode Island, each with less than 
10,000 square miles (Wikipedia, 2010).  Because of Ohio’s location in the Midwest, it is 
not located next to the Mexican border, nor is it the furthest from, but is somewhere in 
the middle.  Ohio is 84.7% White, 2.8% Hispanic, 12.1% Black, 1.6% Asian, and 0.3% 
American Indian, which is not dramatically different from the ethnicity of the entire US 
which is 79.6% White, 15.8% Hispanic, 12.9% Black, 4.6% Asian, and 1.0% American 
Indian (Census, 2010). 
State governments also regulate imported food into their states.  The Food Safety 
Division of Ohio’s Department of Agriculture is Ohio’s equivalent to the USDA and 
regulates imported food and provides notices of food recalls.  Ohio’s Department of 
Public Safety manages the state’s response to a bioterrorism incident by preparing 
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emergency operations plans, conducting training and emergency exercises, and operating 
the state’s emergency operations center during an incident (State of Ohio, 2010). 
Professional Publications and Councils 
Many professional publications provided important information contributing to 
this study.  The Massachusetts Medical Society publishes the medical journal New 
England Journal of Medicine which provides medical research and important information 
in biomedical science and clinical practice (NEJM, 2010).  The American Medical 
Association publishes The Journal of the American Medical Association 48 times per 
year “to promote the science and art of medicine and the betterment of public health” 
(JAMA, 2010).  The Infectious Diseases Society of America publishes the Journal of 
Infectious Diseases that provides “research on the pathogenesis, diagnosis, and treatment 
of infectious diseases, on the microbes that cause them, and on disorders of host immune 
mechanisms” (JID, 2010).  The Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health 
publishes the American Journal of Epidemiology which presents research findings and 
methodological developments in epidemiological research (American Journal of 
Epidemiology, 2010).  The American Academy for Microbiology is a leadership group 
within the American Society for Microbiology and publishes the journal mBio that 
provides research in microbiology (mBio, 2010).  The Institute of Medicine is the health 
organization within the National Academies and is an independent organization that 
provides medical advice to the government and the public to improve health (Institute of 
Medicine, 2010).  Information from their reports was beneficial and was used in this 
study. 
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The Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases, or ProMED, reports on 
outbreaks of infectious diseases and acute exposures to toxins, which includes foodborne 
pathogens.  ProMED operates through the internet, thus allowing it to report rapidly and 
on a global scale to report its information.  ProMED uses media reports, official reports, 
and local observers as sources of information.  ProMED email currently reaches over 
40,000 subscribers in 185 countries.  ProMED has served as an official program for the 
International Society for Infectious Diseases since 1999 (ProMED, 2009).  Data for many 
of the current foodborne outbreaks came from this source. 
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II.  Literature Review 
Introduction 
Many areas were required to be covered to answer the question of what should be 
done to combat biological terrorism from food originating from Mexico.  These areas 
include an understanding of Mexico, the food production process, foodborne pathogens, 
bioterrorism and its effects, and the response from a global, national, and state level.  The 
following literature review sought out information on these topics. 
Mexico 
Because the food in question comes from Mexico, a discussion on Mexico, 
including its government, economy, trade, agriculture, and national security is 
appropriate.  See Figure 2 for a map of Mexico. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Map of Mexico (Bureau of Western Hemispheric Affairs, 2010b) 
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Geography   
The United Mexican States, or Mexico, covers an area of 761,600 square miles, 
which is less than one fourth the size of the contiguous US.  Mexico consists of costal 
lowlands and central high plateaus with mountain ranges that reach up to over 18,000 feet 
above sea level.  Mexico’s climate is desert in the north and tropical in the south (Bureau 
of Western Hemispheric Affairs, 2010b). 
People   
Mexico is the most populated Spanish-speaking country in the world with over 
111 million people.  About three-fourths of the people live in the cities.  Many Mexicans 
are leaving underdeveloped southern states and the crowded central plateau in search of 
opportunities for employment in the industrialized city centers and the developing areas 
along the US border.  The capitol, Mexico City, is an example of this with a metropolitan 
population of nearly 22 million, making it the largest city in the western hemisphere.  The 
border cities of Ciudad Juarez and Tijuana have also recently increased in population.  Of 
Mexico’s of 45.5 million workforce, 21% are involved in the food production industry:  
agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing.  The average Mexican worker earns $13,542 
per year (Bureau of Western Hemispheric Affairs, 2010a). 
Government   
Mexico is a federal republic with 31 states and a federal district.  Although 
Mexico gained its independence from Spain in 1821, its government currently follows the 
1917 constitution.  Mexico has independent executive, legislative, and judicial branches 
in its federal government.  The executive branch, with power vested in the president, has 
historically been the dominant branch.  The president serves a single six-year term with 
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no vice president.  If the president dies or is removed from office, Congress elects a 
provisional president.  The Congress is comprised of a Senate and a Chamber of 
Deputies.  Senators serve a single six-year term while deputies serve a single three-year 
term.  The judiciary is divided into federal and state court systems.  Federal courts have 
jurisdiction over most civil cases and some major felonies.  Trial is by judge and not by 
jury (Bureau of Western Hemispheric Affairs, 2010a). 
Economy and Trade   
Mexico is extremely dependent on exporting to the US.  These exports are worth 
more than a quarter of Mexico’s $1.088 trillion gross domestic product (GDP), which 
shrunk by 6.5% in 2009.  Mexico keeps its minimum wage, which is around $4.50 per 
day, low intentionally in part to help control inflation, which is around 4%.  Mexico’s 
agriculture market is 4% of GDP and produces corn, wheat, soybeans, rice, beans, coffee, 
fruit, tomatoes, beef, poultry, and dairy products.  About 80% of Mexico’s exports in 
2009, worth $185 billion, were sent to the US.  Mexico is the second-largest (48% of 
total) export market for the US, worth $112 billion.  In 2009, Mexico was the world's 
seventh-largest producer of crude oil and the second-largest supplier of oil to the US.  
Revenues from oil and gas provided more than a third of all Mexican government 
revenues and are the country’s largest source of foreign currency (Bureau of Western 
Hemispheric Affairs, 2010b). 
Agriculture   
Only 11% of Mexico’s land can be used for growing crops, and less than 3% is 
currently irrigated.  Corn, tomatoes, sugar cane, dry beans, and avocados are Mexico’s 
top revenue-producing crops.  Beef, poultry, pork, and dairy products also create 
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significant revenue.  Agriculture accounted for 4.3% of Mexico’s GDP in 2009; however, 
agricultural employment made up more than 15% of Mexico’s total employment.  Due to 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Mexico is involved in globalized 
competition in the agricultural sector with some farmers significantly benefiting from 
increased access to the world market.  Fruit and vegetable exports from Mexico have 
dramatically increased recently, becoming greater than $4.7 billion to the US alone in 
2009.  However, farms in Mexico tend to be small with a large subsistence rural 
population that is not part of the formal economy (Bureau of Western Hemispheric 
Affairs, 2010a).  According to the USDA’s FAS, half of Mexico’s food producers are 
subsistence farmers with most of them growing crops or raising livestock on 12 acres or 
less (FAS, 2010). 
For fiscal year 2009, foreign countries supplied nearly seventy-two billion dollars 
worth of agriculture into the United States.  Just behind Canada and the European Union, 
Mexico supplied over eleven billion dollars worth of agricultural products into the 
country according to the USDA’s ERS (2010b).  Most of these products consisted of 
vegetables ($3 billion), alcohol ($2 billion), and fruits and nuts ($2 billion).  Mexico has 
maintained this significant trade status to the United States for at least the last two 
decades.  See Appendix E for a more detailed breakdown. 
Maquiladoras are companies in Mexico that manufacture or process exports, 
including food, into the US.  Because Mexican labor is inexpensive and NAFTA made 
taxes and custom fees negligible, foreign companies benefit from establishing these 
maquiladoras.  Most of these maquiladoras are owned by the US, Japan, and the 
European Union.  With 80% of Mexican goods shipped to the US, these maquiladoras are 
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strategically located within a short drive to the US-Mexican border and are fairly 
common in cities such as Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, and Matamoros that are directly across 
the border from San Diego, El Paso, and Brownsville, respectively.  More than one 
million Mexicans work in over 3,000 maquiladora manufacturing or export assembly 
plants in northern Mexico (Rosenberg, 2007). 
National Security   
Mexico's 225,000 person military consists of an army, navy, and air force.  The 
military provides national defense, narcotics control, and civic action assignments such as 
search and rescue and disaster relief.  Mexico has a 500,000 person federal, state, and 
municipal police force, which includes analysts and investigators.  At the state and local 
level, police maintain order and public security but usually do not investigate crimes.  In 
2009, the Mexican Congress passed legislation increasing the investigative and 
intelligence capabilities of the Federal Police, which was increased from 20,000 
personnel to approximately 32,000.  Mexico’s President Calderon has made fighting 
organized crime a main concern of his administration and has deployed the military to ten 
states to assist or replace the weak and usually corrupt local and state police.  Mexico’s 
armed forces have demonstrated that they are willing to carry out forceful operations 
against the drug cartels (Bureau of Western Hemispheric Affairs, 2010b). 
Mexico is corrupt.  The assumption that most people make of Mexican 
government officials, judges, and law enforcement is that they are “on the take” from 
drug cartels.  While Mexican history before their independence from Spain was full of 
corruption (officials appointed by Spain were expected to support themselves from 
getting their pay from the locals), not much has changed since then.  There seems to 
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always be a shortfall in government revenue to pay for promised services, so corruption, 
in the form of accepting of bribes or extortion, made up the difference and became a way 
to pay for government operations (Harms, 1995).  It seems that corruption is necessary 
for Mexico to maintain order and stability.  The Spanish phrase “plata o plombo” or 
“silver or lead,” meaning to accept a bribe (silver) or accept a bullet (lead) is the way of 
life in Mexico (Bowen, 2001).  With organized crime so pervasive in Mexican society, it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, for public officials or law enforcement officers to 
escape corruption.  This corruption is the largest obstacle for the Mexican government.  
In this type of environment, the threat of a bioterrorist attack on America’s food supply 
coming from Mexico is real. 
Mexican drug cartels are affecting the inspection process.  Due to the violence 
resulting from the Mexican government’s law enforcement efforts against drug cartels, 
the USDA has had to change the way they inspect Mexican cattle coming into the US.  
Mexico imported 940,869 live cattle into the US in 2009 (ERS, 2011b) because many US 
cattle feedlots depend upon the new cattle that Mexico provides.  USDA livestock 
inspections can prevent infected cattle from entering the American food supply.  
However, two incidents south of the Texas/Mexico border affected the inspections and 
hence the trade with Mexico.  USDA inspectors travel into Mexico to conduct health 
inspections on the cattle in “export pens” before the cattle are allowed to enter the US.  
One USDA inspector was held at gunpoint by a cartel member and another inspector was 
robbed in another city.  The USDA prohibited their inspectors from traveling through 
these two ports of entry unless the State Department determined that conditions were 
safe, making inspections a daily decision.  The result is that Mexico sends their cattle to 
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different ports of entry, thus overloading those ports of entry and decreasing trade.  
Additionally, the USDA has established temporary inspection stations on the US side of 
the border where the holding pens are smaller and when one head of cattle is rejected, the 
entire load of cattle is sent back to Mexico (Crosby, 2010). 
Food Production Process 
The food production process starts at the farm where the raw materials are grown 
or livestock are raised.  The farm may be a fruit or vegetable farm; an orchard with fruit 
or nut trees; a vineyard with grape vines; a market garden that grows vegetables; a ranch 
used for raising grazing livestock like cattle, sheep, or other meat-producing animals; a 
poultry farm with chickens, turkeys, or other fowls raised for their meat or eggs; a dairy 
farm with milk cows (or goats or other mammals); fish farms with captive fish; fields of 
grain; or a plantation with sugar cane, coffee, or tobacco. 
Once the crops have matured, they are ready to be harvested from the fields.  
Grain is usually reaped, or cut, using a scythe, sickle, or reaper.  Larger farms may use 
larger and more expensive farm machinery like a combine harvester.  While still on the 
farm, the crops may require drying, sorting, cleaning, and/or packing before being 
transported elsewhere. 
While some produce may be immediately ready for human consumption, most 
farm products require further processing.  These farm products are taken to food 
processing facilities where they go through sometimes numerous and varied food 
processes.  Added to the food may be water, salt, or a number of other ingredients.  The 
processed food may be frozen or dried, or placed in bottles, cans, boxes, plastic, or bags.  
Livestock are killed and processed for consumption as food products at slaughterhouses. 
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Now that the food has been processed, the product is ready to be shipped to 
market.  There was a time when consumers either grew most of their food themselves or 
bought their food from local producers, usually small-scale farmers.  Currently, long-
distance shipping is routine and international trade is widespread (Buckley, 2010).  Food 
processors ship their products in individual packages and in bulk containers.  They use 
railroad cars, trucks, boats, and planes for transportation. 
The market, or food retailers, mentioned in the previous paragraph consist of 
many kinds of businesses:  grocery stores, restaurants, and food service or catering 
businesses that serve schools, hospitals, and nursing homes.  Other food retailers include 
convenience stores, health food stores, and even online grocers.  This is where we go to 
buy the food that we will eat. 
While food production, harvesting, storage, transportation, and the sale of food 
might be somewhat similar for many of the same types of food, food preparation at the 
level of the consumer is extremely diverse.  Household appliances such as ovens, stoves, 
microwaves, grills, deep fryers, broilers, toasters, mixers, blenders, juicers, refrigerators, 
freezers, pots and pans, food processors, bread machines, waffle irons, and slow cookers, 
just to name a few, are commonly used every day in our kitchens to prepare the food we 
eat (Buckley, 2010).  See Figure 3 for the food production process. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Food Production Process (WHO, 2008; Buckley, 2010) 
Agricultural Production → Harvesting → Storage and Transportation → Processing 
→ Storage and Transportation → Wholesale and Retail Distribution → Consumer 
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Foodborne Pathogens 
 
Foodborne Diseases 
Consuming biologically contaminated food or drinks can cause a foodborne 
disease.  Once in the digestive tract, the microbe can reproduce, produce toxins, and 
invade other regions of the body.  This “incubation” period, lasting from hours to days, 
may be followed by nausea, diarrhea, and abdominal cramping, depending upon the 
organism producing the disease (CDC, “Frequently”, 2005).  The CDC estimates that 
47.8 million cases of foodborne disease occur each year in the US resulting in 128,000 
hospitalizations and 3,000 deaths (Scallan, et al., 2011; Appendix B). 
According to the CDC, the most common foodborne diseases are caused by 
Salmonella, norovirus, Campylobacter, Toxoplasma, E. coli O157, Listeria, and 
Clostridium perfringens (Scallan, et al., 2011; Appendix B).  Usually, the foodborne 
infections are identified after several infected people seek medical care.  There are 
laboratory tests that identify the organism responsible for the illness.  Culturing stool 
samples identify bacteria, while viruses are usually identified by testing stool samples for 
genetic markers that indicate which virus is present.  Many foodborne illnesses remain 
undiagnosed because the sick person does not seek medical attention or no test is 
conducted.  The CDC estimated that, for every case of salmonellosis that is diagnosed 
and reported, 38 cases actually occur.  Also, for over half of the foodborne outbreaks 
reported to the CDC, no pathogen can be identified (CDC, “Frequently”, 2005). 
The CDC reports that local and state health departments investigate between 400 
and 500 outbreaks each year (CDC, “Frequently”, 2005).  Note that an outbreak is 
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defined as an event “when a group of people consume the same contaminated food and 
two or more of them come down with the same illness” (CDC, “Frequently”, 2005:5). 
Survivability 
Microorganisms require nutrients and usually a narrow range of environmental 
conditions to survive.  Some survive only within their human hosts.  Some need oxygen 
while some cannot survive in oxygen.  Many are destroyed in sunlight and other 
environmental stressors.  Most require a narrow range of temperature, pressure, and pH.  
Despite all this, some infectious organisms have found a way to make it onto our dinner 
tables and cause infections.  The following are the four pathogens in this study with 
results of experiments conducted to determine how survivable some of our foodborne 
pathogens are. 
Salmonella.  A variety of types of Salmonella, especially serotypes 
Typhimurium and Enteritidis, can survive in a wide range of environments.  These 
include differences in nutrients, pH, temperature, and oxygen, as well as the 
environmental stressors of osmotic shock and DNA damage (Ngwai, et al., 2007).  
Salmonella has been shown to not only survive, but to grow, on the surfaces of cut 
melons, watermelons, and papayas at temperatures as low as 10°C (Golden, et al., 1993; 
Escartin, et al., 1989). 
E. coli.  E. coli has been shown to be able to survive on cubes of 
cantaloupes and watermelon down to 5°C when stored for 34 hours and on their rinds 
under humid conditions for 14-22 days (Del Rossario and Beuchat, 1995).  A similar 
study demonstrated that E. coli was able to grow on the surface of strawberries after 24 
hours at 23°C and survive at 5°C and -20°C for three days (Yu, et al., 2001). 
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Listeria.  Listeria monocytogenes has been shown to survive on chicken 
breasts that were cooked at one of five different temperatures (150°F, 160°F, 165°F, 
170°F, and 180°F) and sealed in plastic for four weeks at 4°C and 10°C (Carpenter and 
Harrison, 1989).  Even after pasteurizing milk at 71.7°C for 15 seconds, the standard for 
pasteurization, Listeria monocytogenes has been shown to survive (Doyle, et al., 1987).  
Ground beef not cooked to the proper temperature remained contaminated with Listeria 
monocytogenes after refrigeration at 4°C and freezing at -20°C (Novak and Juneja, 2003). 
C. botulinum.  A pH less than 4.6 has been shown to limit the spore 
germination, growth, and (most importantly) toxin production for C. botulinum.  
Therefore, acidic conditions have been relied upon to keep this hazard in check.  C. 
botulinum spores have been shown to be able to survive in an acidic environment (4.2 
pH) for 180 days (Odlaug and Pflug, 1977). 
Previous Biological Outbreaks 
Contaminated food outbreaks occur naturally every year.  This study uses as 
many outbreaks in the US as could be found.  The sources for information on these 
outbreaks includes the CDC, WHO, ProMED, and state health departments.  Appendix F 
consists of a detailed description of previous biological outbreaks with sources cited.  
Appendix G summarizes those outbreaks.  Note that this list is not exhaustive, but should 
provide insight into some characteristics of the different foodborne pathogens. 
Salmonella, E. coli, Listeria, and C. botulinum were the four most frequent causes 
of foodborne outbreaks found in this study from 1977 to 2010.  This section will provide 
some observations while a more detailed analysis is conducted in the Results chapter.  
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Note from Table 1 and Figure 4 that Salmonella caused the most outbreaks with 17, while 
E. coli caused the least number with 10.   
 
 
Table 1.  The Four Most Frequent Causes of Foodborne Outbreaks 1977-2010 (Appendix F) 
 Salmonella E. coli Listeria C. botulinum TOTAL 
Outbreaks 17 10 13 11 51 
Deaths 7 5 105 2 119 
Infections 245,257 1,269 472 191 247,189 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Number of Outbreaks for the Four Most Frequent Causes of                                  
Foodborne Outbreaks 1977-2010 (Appendix F) 
   
Also observe from Figure 5 that, by a large margin, Listeria caused the most 
deaths, 105, with relatively fewer infections, 472, than Salmonella or E. coli, 245,257 and 
1,269 respectively. 
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Figure 5.  Number of Deaths for the Four Most Frequent Causes of                                        
Foodborne Outbreaks 1977-2010 (Appendix F) 
 
By far, Salmonella infected the largest number of people, 238,427, as shown by 
Figure 6.  Note that the number of infections is represented by a logarithmic scale, so 
Salmonella is two orders of magnitude, or one-hundred times, that of E. coli.  Salmonella 
is responsible for the four largest outbreak infections in this study, nine of the ten largest 
outbreaks, and fourteen of the twenty-one largest outbreaks See Table 2. 
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Figure 6.  Number of Infections for the Four Most Frequent Causes of                                        
Foodborne Outbreaks 1977-2010 (Appendix F) 
 
 
Table 2.  Most Infections from Previous Foodborne Outbreaks 
Year Food Died Infected Pathogen 
1994 Ice cream 0 224,000 Salmonella 
1985 Milk 4 16,284 Salmonella 
2010 Eggs 0 1,519 Salmonella 
2008 Salsa 2 1,442 Salmonella 
1999 Water 2 781 E. coli 
2010 Ground beef 0 500 Salmonella 
2006 Peanut butter 0 425 Salmonella 
2007 Pot pies 0 272 Salmonella 
2009 Alfalfa sprouts 0 235 Salmonella 
2006 Tomatoes 0 183 Salmonella 
2006 Spinach 1 183 E. coli 
1985 Cheese 48 142 Listeria 
2010 Bean sprouts 0 106 Salmonella 
1998 Hot dogs 17 75 Listeria 
2006 Lettuce 0 71 E. coli 
2009 Cookie dough 0 65 E. coli 
2007 Snack food 0 65 Salmonella 
2010 Duck eggs 1 63 Salmonella 
2007 Pet food 0 62 Salmonella 
1977 Hot sauce 0 59 C. botulinum 
2008 Cantaloupe 0 51 Salmonella 
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Humans can serve as reservoirs for infectious diseases.  Mary Mallon, known as 
the famous “Typhoid Mary,” was an Irish emigrant who worked as a cook in the New 
York City area 1900-1907 and then again 1910-1915.  Unknown to her, she was a carrier 
of the typhoid bacteria despite being healthy herself.  While serving as a cook, she spread 
the bacteria to at least 53 people with three dying of typhoid fever.  The New York City 
Health Department quarantined her twice:  1907-1910 and 1915-1938.  An autopsy at her 
death in 1938 revealed that Mary was still infectious with the live typhoid bacteria and 
that it was located in her gallbladder (New York Times, 1938). 
Foodborne Pathogens found in Mexico.  Several foodborne pathogens have 
been identified in Mexico (Hollinger, 1999).  The list includes some that are common to 
the US, including Salmonella, Campylobacter, and E. coli.  However, several pathogens 
are rarely seen in the US and may be considered for use by future terrorists.   
Vibrio cholera.  The bacteria Vibrio cholera causes the disease cholera, 
which is a severe illness that causes diarrhea, vomiting, and leg cramps.  The rapid loss of 
body fluids could result in severe dehydration, shock, and death in as rapid as several 
hours, although symptoms usually occur in 2-3 days.  Although cholera is common in 
underdeveloped nations, industrialized countries have been free from cholera for the past 
century due to developed water treatment systems.  Cholera can be found in feces-
contaminated water and food.  The disease is easily treated.  Affected patients should 
immediately replace loss fluids and salts in the form of an oral rehydration solution or 
intravenous fluids for severe cases.  Antibiotics may also shorten the illness’s duration 
and severity (CDC, “Cholera”, 2010j).  The CDC reports (“Foodborne Outbreak”, 2011a) 
that bottled water without broken seals and bottled or canned carbonated drinks are safe 
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for use.  This may apply only to natural outbreaks and not deliberate acts of terrorism.  
Because 100 million cholera bacteria are required for a healthy adult to become infected 
(MedicineNet, 2011), terrorists would require a large quantity of V. cholerae to infect a 
large number of Americans in the US. 
Salmonella Typhi.  While typhoid fever is a common infection in 
underdeveloped nations, affecting about 21.5 million people annually, there are only 
about 400 typhoid fever infections in the US each year caused by Salmonella Typhi 
bacteria.  About 300 of these people are infected outside of the US.  Salmonella Typhi 
infects people through food and drink contaminated from tainted water or contaminated 
people.  Symptoms include a high fever, weakness, stomach pain, headache, and loss of 
appetite.  There is a vaccine against Salmonella Typhi, but, if infected, patients may be 
treated with antibiotics.  While treated patients rarely die, up to one in five infected 
people may die if untreated (CDC, “Typhoid Fever,” 2010k). 
Brucella.  Brucellosis has been in Mexico since the beginning of the 1900s 
and is endemic with the disease (Luna-Martinez and Mejia-Teran, 2002).  Mexico has 
averaged more than 2,000 brucellosis infections and almost 20 deaths annually (Pacheco 
and Luna-Martinez, 1999).  People are infected by consuming unpasteurized milk and 
milk products such as cheese.  As much as 35% of Mexican cow’s milk and 85% of goat 
milk is unpasteurized with no sanitary surveillance (Luna-Martinez, 1999).  In the US, 
there are only 100 to 200 infections annually because we pasteurize our milk which kills 
the Brucella bacteria (CDC, “Brucellosis”, 2007b) 
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Bioterrorism 
Goals of Terrorism 
People and organizations conduct terrorist acts to attain or get closer to their 
objectives, whether that is to establish a more desirable government, destroy a hated 
population of people, repel enemy forces, increase a country’s land and people, or to stop 
the destructive acts of others.  Terrorists further their objectives by creating fear; 
provoking overreaction by their enemies; widening a conflict; obtaining recognition for 
their cause; gaining media attention; embarrassing, harassing, or weakening government; 
gaining or destroying capital or property; influencing government decisions; freeing 
prisoners; or satisfying vengeance (International Terrorism and Security Research, 2010). 
Previous Bioterrorist Attacks 
By understanding how terrorists have used biological agents in the past, perhaps 
we can anticipate how they will use them in the future and be able to adequately 
counteract their bioterrorism. 
Over 2,000 years ago, armies poisoned water supplies and the tips of arrows in the 
earliest examples of biological warfare.  Medieval times saw armies catapulting infected 
dead bodies over besieged city walls.  Japan and their Unit 731 used biological weapons 
against the Chinese during the late 1930s and early 1940s. 
While there have been many more unsuccessful attempts at bioterrorism, the 
following are events in the US that biological agents were used and reached their 
intended targets or destinations. 
The 1984 Rajneeshee Salmonella Attacks.  Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh and 
thousands of his followers moved to northern Oregon and desired to politically control 
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that area, starting with Wasco County.  Because they did not have enough voting 
members for their own candidates to win an election, they decided to use the Salmonella 
bacteria to keep county members from voting.  On 29 August 1984, followers of 
Rajneesh poisoned two county commissioners with glasses of water containing 
Salmonella bacteria.  Both men became sick with one being hospitalized.  A subsequent 
attempt to contaminate doorknobs, urinal handles, and produce markets failed.  Finally, in 
September and October 1984, they spread Salmonella bacteria on the salad bars of ten 
local restaurants.  The salmonella infected 751 people who developed acute 
gastroenteritis.  The hospital treated 45 victims with no deaths.  Only one of the ten 
affected restaurants financially survived.  Two followers of Rajneesh each served 29 
months in jail.  This incident was the first and largest bioterrorism attack in America 
(Rothwell, 2004). 
The 1996 Shigella dysenteria Contamination.  On 29 October 1996, a disgruntled 
former laboratory employee in Dallas, Texas, deliberately contaminated pastries placed in 
the staff break room with Shigella dysenteria type 2 from the laboratory’s stock strain.  
Twelve laboratory staff developed severe acute diarrheal illness with four being 
hospitalized (WHO, 2008; Kolavic, et al., 1997). 
The 2001 Anthrax Attacks.  The 2001 anthrax attacks immediately followed the 
September 11 attacks and came in two waves.  A total of seven letters are believed to 
have been used.  The first five letters, postmarked 18 September 2001, were mailed to 
four New York City news organizations and a newspaper in Florida.  The letters 
contained anthrax that appeared to be brown and granular.  The last two letters, 
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postmarked 9 October, were sent to senators and opened on 15 October and 16 
November.  These letters contained a more refined powdery anthrax.  The contaminated 
letters infected at least 22 victims and five of those died.  Several contaminated buildings 
were decontaminated by fumigation and chlorine dioxide gas at a reported cost of over 
one billion dollars.  Federal prosecutors declared that a Dr. Ivins, a scientist working at 
Fort Detrick, Maryland, was the sole author of the anthrax letters (Warrick, 2010). 
The 2003 Ricin Letters.  On 15 October 2003, a mail-sorting facility located in 
Greenville, South Carolina, received a package containing a letter and a small metal vial 
containing ricin powder.  On 6 November, the White House mail-processing center in 
Washington, D.C., received a nearly identical letter addressed to the White House.  This 
letter also contained a small vial containing a white powdery substance later identified as 
ricin.  Both letters were written by “Fallen Angel” and threatened ricin attacks if recently-
approved federal trucking regulations became effective.  On 2 February 2004, ricin 
powder was found on a mail sorting machine in the Dirksen Senate Office Building in 
Washington, D.C.  Although there was no vial or letter with the ricin, this contamination 
is possibly related to the previous two letters.  Fortunately, these incidents caused no 
injuries, but “Fallen Angel” was never found (CDC, “Investigation of a Ricin”, 2003a; 
FBI, 2004). 
Threats of bioterrorism are not all in the past.  One of the foreign terrorist 
organizations (see Appendix D) is Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP.  Fox 
News reported that AQAP wants to attack the US food supplies (Levine, 2010).  The 
source providing the information indicated that AQAP would target food, perhaps salad 
bars and buffets, at hotels and restaurants within the US.  This is the same organization 
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that tried to detonate explosives-laden underwear over Detroit on 25 December 2009 and 
sent two explosives-laden packages from Yemen to the US in October 2010. 
Why Use Biological Agents?   
Morris (2007) gave three reasons why terrorists might prefer to use a biological 
agent instead of a radioactive dispersal device, or dirty bomb.  First, it would be easier to 
obtain, develop, transport, and deploy a biological agent than radioactive waste (Morris, 
2007; Congress, 1999).  Biological pathogens are abundant and easily obtained and 
grown while radioactive material is rare and must be found, protected, and shielded and 
cannot be grown.  In fact, the amount of radiological material continues to decrease over 
time.  Biological pathogens can easily fit into a small glass container while radioactive 
material must be shielded to avoid detection or harming those people not the intended 
target.  Biological pathogens can be easily placed in food, while radiological material 
used as a radioactive dispersal device must have explosives and reach their intended 
targets, usually by inhalation.  
Second, biological agents could be obtained and reproduced in small quantities 
that would be hard to detect and therefore reducing the risk of detection and apprehension 
before executing the attack.  Third, people would be soft targets because of the difficulty 
in protecting them from the food that they require (Morris, 2007; Congress, 1999). 
In a report on the 1984 Rajneeshee Salmonella attacks, Thomas Rothwell of the 
Center for Army Analysis stated that “by choosing the appropriate agent, production of 
large quantities of bacteria is inexpensive and involves simple equipment and skills.  
Terrorist groups do not need highly trained technicians or numerous and expensive pieces 
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of scientific equipment in order to obtain enough deadly pathogen necessary to carry out 
their attacks” (Rothwell, 2004). 
Availability of Foodborne Pathogens in Mexico.  Many of the foodborne 
pathogens are easily obtained naturally, as evidenced by the extent that people in the food 
production process take to avoid the pathogens (and some still make it through).  
Salmonella can be found in eggs, meat, poultry, milk, and produce.  In fact, a 2005 
investigation revealed in a sampling of US food that 5.7% of all meat and 33% of poultry 
tested positive for Salmonella (Heymann, 2008).  E. coli can be found in beef, produce, 
milk, and contaminated water.  Listeria monocytogenes is found in milk, cheese, 
vegetables, and ready-to-eat meats (hot dogs, etc.).  C. botulinum can be found in home-
canned vegetables and fruits that have been improperly heated or preserved (Heymann, 
2008).  These and many others can be found in contaminated water and food and cultured 
by terrorists with as little as a university degree in microbiology or other related field.   
Biological agents are abundantly available.  Pathogenic microbiological agents 
can be found in clinical and other laboratories, including laboratories involved in food 
control.  Even college chemistry or microbiology often provides sufficient knowledge to 
produce adequate amounts of a variety of biological agents (WHO, 2008).  Foodborne 
pathogens are readily available in Mexico.   
Foodborne Outbreak Versus Bioterrorist Attack 
Aum Shinrikyo is the cult responsible for the 20 March 1995 sarin attack on the Tokyo 
subway system killing 12 commuters.  What sometimes goes unmentioned is their 
bioterroist attacks previous to their use of sarin.  Aum Shinrikyo experimented with 
botulin toxin, anthrax, cholera, Q fever and Ebola virus.  They attempted four biological 
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attacks from April 1990 to March 1995.  Attacks included botulin toxin and anthrax 
spores.  No injuries resulted from any of these attacks (Olson, 1999).  The year following 
their sarin attack, about 8,000 children in Sakai City, Japan, became infected by E. coli 
from eating contaminated radish sprouts in their school lunches.  Some of the children 
died (WHO, 2008; Mermin and Griffin, 1999).  Natural outbreaks can usually be more 
devastating than man’s acts of bioterrorism.  See Tables 3 and 4 for comparisons between 
biological outbreaks and bioterrorism. 
 
 
Table 3.  Comparison of Most Infections from Previous Foodborne Outbreaks                                  
and from Bioterrorist Attacks 
Year Food Died Infected Pathogen 
1994 Ice cream 0 224,000 Salmonella 
1985 Milk 4 16,284 Salmonella 
2010 Eggs 0 1,519 Salmonella 
2008 Salsa 2 1,442 Salmonella 
1999 Water 2 781 E. coli 
1984 BIOTERRORIST 0 751 Samonella 
2010 Ground beef 0 500 Salmonella 
2006 Peanut butter 0 425 Salmonella 
2007 Pot pies 0 272 Salmonella 
2009 Alfalfa sprouts 0 235 Salmonella 
2006 Tomatoes 0 183 Salmonella 
2006 Spinach 1 183 E. coli 
1985 Cheese 48 142 Listeria 
2010 Bean sprouts 0 106 Salmonella 
1998 Hot dogs 17 75 Listeria 
2006 Lettuce 0 71 E. coli 
2009 Cookie dough 0 65 E. coli 
2007 Snack food 0 65 Salmonella 
2010 Duck eggs 1 63 Salmonella 
2007 Pet food 0 62 Salmonella 
1977 Hot sauce 0 59 C. botulinum 
2008 Cantaloupe 0 51 Salmonella 
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Table 4.  Comparison of Most Deaths from Previous Foodborne Outbreaks                                         
and from Bioterrorist Attacks 
Year Food Died Infected Pathogen 
1985 Cheese 48 142 Listeria 
1998 Hot dogs 17 75 Listeria 
1986 Unknown 16 36 Listeria 
2002 Turkey 7 46 Listeria 
2001 BIOTERRORIST 5 22 B. anthracis 
2010 Celery 5 10 Listeria 
1985 Milk 4 16,284 Salmonella 
1983 Milk 4 49 Listeria 
2000 Turkey 4 21 Listeria 
2007 Milk 3 5 Listeria 
2008 Salsa 2 1,442 Salmonella 
1999 Water 2 781 E. coli 
1978 At Restaurant 2 34 C. botulinum 
2009 Ground beef 2 26 E. coli 
2006 Spinach 1 183 E. coli 
2010 Duck eggs 1 63 Salmonella 
1989 Shrimp 1 10 Listeria 
 
 
Effects 
A bioterrorism attack could affect many key areas to US interests to include 
psychological (fear of additional attacks and panic), financial (billions of dollars lost 
from the attack and to restore, prevent another attack, losses in trade, etc.), government 
(loss of trust), and state’s rights (control of the National Guard, state border control) 
(Morris, 2007). 
Illness, Disease, and Death   
The potential hazardous agents that could be used in food terrorism have the 
potential to cause immediate death, illness, or injury.  For example, 48 people in 
California died with 142 infected with Listeria monocytogenes from eating Mexican-style 
cheese in 1985 (California, 2010; CDC, “Epidemiologic Notes and Reports Listeriosis”, 
38 
 
1985a).  These biological agents could also cause long-term health effects, such as cancer 
and birth defects (WHO, 2008).  WHO refers to the 1988 outbreak in Shanghai, China, 
when it states that “if the unintentional contamination of one food, such as clams, can 
infect 300,000 individuals with a serious debilitating disease, then a concerted, deliberate 
attack could be devastating, especially if a more dangerous agent was used” (WHO, 
2008:7).  However, the bioterrorist attack that killed the most people, the 2001 anthrax 
letters, only killed five while hospitalizing seventeen (Morris, 2007; Hope, 2004).   
Economic and Trade Devastation   
A terrorist may target a manufactured product, a manufacturing company, an 
industry, or an entire nation in an attempt to disrupt or destroy an economy.  For 
example, the WHO cites the example of bioterrorists contaminating Israeli exported 
citrus fruit in 1978, resulting in significant disruption of Israeli trade with several 
European countries (WHO, 2008).  Grapes from Chile were recalled from North 
American markets in 1989 when the grapes were contaminated with cyanide, resulting in 
reluctance of consumers to buy any fruit from Chile and costing several hundred million 
dollars in lost trade export.  More than a hundred companies lost their business (WHO, 
2008; Root-Bernstein, 1991).  The best example is the bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy outbreak, also known as Mad Cow Disease, in England, where 4.5 
million cattle were destroyed in an effort to stop the spread of spongiform encephalitis, 
resulting in a loss of billions of dollars in European agricultural trade (Sustainable Table, 
2010).  In 2003, a single cow that tested positive for Mad Cow Disease in Washington 
State caused the closure or restriction of the US beef markets in Canada, Mexico, South 
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Korea, Japan, and other countries, resulting in an $11 billion loss to the US beef industry 
between 2004 and 2007 (Doering, 2008; Morris, 2007; Presley, 2004). 
Reduce Food Supply   
A bioterrorist attack might cause a mass disruption of the food supply and limit 
food availability and destroy the area’s long term financial market (Morris, 2007; Hope, 
2004). 
Overwhelming Public Health Services   
Upon the outbreak of a foodborne outbreak, whether natural or the result of a 
bioterrorist attack, hospitals and clinics would likely become flooded with not only the 
sick, but also those who feel that they might be affected, also known as the “worried 
well.”  For example, when terrorists attacked commuters on the Tokyo subway system 
with sarin nerve gas in 1995, only 12 people died.  However, 5,000 people sought 
medical care.  The emergency response to the attack was rapid and substantial with 131 
ambulances, 1,364 emergency medical technicians, and 688 patients transported to the 
hospitals.  Beyond this, more than 4,000 people made their own way to hospitals 
(Okumura, 1998).  With hospitals operating near capacity, such a surge would 
overwhelm public health services and could cause confusion and a slowing of service. 
Political and Social Implications   
Even a small dissemination of a biological agent resulting in only few casualties 
can result in significant disruption and much public apprehension.  The anthrax letter 
attack consisted of only five to seven letters infecting only twenty-two people with five 
deaths (Sobel, et al., 2002).  However, the attacks resulted in increases in government 
funding for biological warfare research, planning, and preparedness.  The National 
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Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases’ budget increased by $1.5 billion in 2003 and 
the Project BioShield Act, for purchasing new vaccines and medications, was funded 
with $5.6 billion during a ten year period starting in 2004 (White House, 2004).  In the 
event of a bioterrorist attack, Americans may doubt that the government is able to protect 
American citizens from terrorism. 
National Planning Scenario 13 (Biological Attack – Food Contamination)   
FEMA (2005a) developed National Planning Scenario 13 (Biological Attack – 
Food Contamination) to determine the results from a scenario of ground beef 
contaminated with anthrax and distributed to three cities throughout the nation.  FEMA 
calculated that there would be 1,800 people infected with 650 people hospitalized and 
500 deaths.  The production facilities and distribution plants suffered significant 
disruption and downtime due to decontamination.  The ground beef industry was 
significantly affected with service disruption.  Other food industries were also affected, 
but to a smaller scale.  There was a significant direct financial impact on the meat 
industry with long-term effects (FEMA, 2005b). 
Timeline   
National Planning Scenario 13 includes a timeline of when events would be 
expected to occur.  See Table 5 below. 
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Table 5.  Timeline for a Biological Attack (FEMA, 2005b) 
Day Event 
1 The biological agent is mixed with the food and is shipped. 
3 The first infected victims visit hospital emergency rooms. 
3-13 There is a significant influx of infected victims visiting hospital 
emergency rooms with thousands of mass casualties. 
6 Health departments, the CDC, the FDA, and the USDA begin 
conducting epidemiological investigations. 
28 A contaminated product trace is made to the contaminated food 
production facility.  Decontamination commences at the facility. 
34 Hospitals report no new cases of illness. 
 
 
 
Sandia National Laboratories (JASON, 2003) provides the following timeline for 
a bioterrorism attack in Figure 7.  There is about a three-day delay after infection for 
symptoms to appear followed by weeks of sick victims. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  Nominal Timeline for a Bioterrorism Attack (JASON, 2003) 
 
 
 
Our Response 
“Concern for food safety is a privilege of the wealthy” (Buckley, 2010:28). 
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Identification and Foodborne Illness Surveillance and Investigation 
Why identification is important.  The most important part of an 
investigation of a suspected foodborne outbreak is the identification.  To allow for the 
quick treatment of exposed people and the removal of the contaminated food products 
from access to the consumer, the biological agent causing the illnesses must be identified 
as well as what food products are contaminated and by what method the biological agent 
is reaching the consumer (WHO, 2008).   
Identification is difficult.  Unprocessed agricultural products grown on 
small farms are often combined with the products from other farms to create larger 
shipments.  These shipments are often distributed over large geographical areas, 
sometimes over the world.  As a consequence, it is difficult, in some cases, to positively 
identify the actual manufacturer of an infected shipment (WHO, 2008). 
Because contamination often occurs infrequently and not at levels high enough 
for detection, regular sampling may not be enough to identify a bioterrorist attack.  
Routine food testing will detect only persistent or widespread contamination and smaller 
incidents will remain overlooked.  Additionally, testing the final product cannot readily 
identify where along the food production chain the contamination occurred.  Therefore, 
more frequent testing earlier in the food production process may need to be conducted 
(Buckley, 2010). 
Whether the desired outcome is to reduce the effects of a bioterrorism attack or a 
natural foodborne outbreak, preventive actions must be taken quickly.  However, the type 
of information essential to reduce infections and deaths moves at a snail’s pace, if at all, 
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from the doctor’s office or hospital to the local health department and to some type of 
tracking system. 
How we identify.  While local and state health or agriculture departments 
investigate smaller outbreaks of foodborne disease (Buckley, 2010), larger outbreaks 
require assistance from resources provided by the federal government.  These federally-
coordinated networks include PulseNet, FoodNet, OutbreakNet, and ESSENCE. 
PulseNet.  The CDC coordinates a program called PulseNet, which is a 
national network of public health and food regulatory agency laboratories.  The network 
is comprised of and receives input from state and local health departments and federal 
agencies such as the USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) and Animal and 
Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), and the Department of Health and Human 
Services’ (HHS) FDA and CDC.  Using the bacteria from infected patients or 
contaminated food, these PulseNet participants perform molecular subtyping, or 
“fingerprinting”, of the pathogenic bacteria at the DNA level.  These laboratories 
electronically submit these “fingerprints” to the CDC’s database for comparison with 
known strains of organisms.  The information collected on the database is available on-
demand to any of the participating laboratories for rapid comparison and identification 
for tracking outbreaks.  PulseNet allows outbreak detection even in the case of widely 
dispersed individual infections (Buckley, 2010; CDC, “PulseNet”, 2009b).  For example, 
PulseNet detected the 2002 Western States E. coli outbreak in 18 days, resulting in 34 
illnesses and no deaths.  A similar E. coli outbreak in 1993, before PulseNet was used, 
required 39 days for detection, resulting in 726 illnesses and 4 deaths.  The more rapid 
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detection led to a faster product recall and helped to prevent additional illnesses and 
deaths (Institute of Medicine, 2008). 
FoodNet.  The Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network, or 
FoodNet, is a collective surveillance effort supported by the CDC, FDA, USDA, and ten 
sites scattered throughout the US.  It is not intended to serve as an outbreak investigation 
system but instead focuses on characterizing the total effects of the foodborne disease by 
active surveillance and associated epidemiological studies designed to assist public health 
managers better understand the patterns of the foodborne disease (Buckley 2010; CDC, 
“FoodNet”, 2010e). 
OutbreakNet.  OutbreakNet is a CDC-led national network of 
epidemiologists and public health officials who investigate outbreaks of foodborne, 
waterborne, and other enteric illnesses in the US.  Members include all state and local 
health departments, the USDA, the FDA, and PulseNet.  The goal for OutbreakNet is to 
ensure quick and coordinated detection and response to multi-state outbreaks of enteric 
diseases and to improve outbreak surveillance (CDC, “OutbreakNet”, 2010g). 
Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Community-
based Epidemics (ESSENCE).  ESSENCE looks for similar illnesses, their locations, and 
the time of their occurrence to provide the earliest possible warning of a biological 
outbreak or attack.  Data originates from emergency rooms, private practice billing codes, 
work and school absenteeism, and medication usage (Lombardo, et al., 2003). 
World Health Organization Plan 
As stated in the Literature Review, the WHO believes in “taking sensible 
precautions, coupled with establishing and strengthening surveillance and response 
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capacity” (WHO, 2008:Executive Summary) to fight food terrorism.  The WHO’s plan 
uses two main strategies: prevention and response. 
Prevention.  WHO defines prevention of food terrorism as “preventing 
the sabotage of food during production, processing, distribution and preparation” (WHO, 
2008:12).  As with many systems developed, prevention is always the first line of defense 
and is preferred over response options.  WHO believes that “the keys to preventing food 
terrorism are establishing and enhancing food safety management programmes and 
implementing reasonable security measures” (WHO, 2008:Executive Summary).  
Prevention is made more difficult by the global food market and the wide diversity of 
food sources. 
Both the food industry and the government are involved and share 
responsibility in keeping our food safe.  WHO also believes that cooperation between 
government and industry best realizes prevention because the most important way to 
decrease food risks remain with the food industry itself.  Among WHO beliefs are that 
the food industry owns the responsibility for reducing the likelihood of deliberate 
contamination of food, starting with the raw materials all the way to distribution of the 
product, because these companies own and often protect their sometimes unique 
production methods.  WHO believes that, instead of creating new programs, food safety 
management programs should be strengthened through systems that already exist (WHO, 
2008). 
The food industry should be supported by government in strengthening 
existing food safety management systems.  This includes the prevention of deliberate 
contamination.  Governments should also promote preventive food safety by using 
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voluntary and regulatory controls. National policies and resources to support the food 
industry infrastructure need to be prepared and food legislation, food monitoring, food 
surveillance, food inspection, foodborne disease surveillance, education, and training 
need to be satisfactory and current (WHO, 2008). 
In an effort to prevent deliberate contamination in the food industry, WHO 
recommends increasing the security of people and premises, developing security and 
response plans, safeguarding sources of raw materials and storage facilities and 
transportation, and controlling and documenting access to critical areas.  During the 
production and harvesting of agricultural products, WHO recommends certain security 
measures such as tamper-resistant or tamper-evident systems, controlling access to 
critical control points like the point of introduction of raw materials into the processing 
stream and open-air drying, and sampling and analysis of certain completed products.  
During the processing and manufacturing phases in the food production chain, WHO 
identifies the slaughterhouse, the water used in food processing, and air systems as being 
vulnerable and recommends protection and inspection of these facilities (WHO, 2008).  
WHO recommends fences, locks, on-site security personnel, and alarms to 
safeguard food during its storage and transportation to market.  Because pre-packaged 
and bulk foods are vulnerable, WHO recommends more secure containers for these items.  
Additionally, wholesalers and retailers should use reliable suppliers and avoid unusually 
low priced food.  Even those foods that have arrived safely in restaurants are vulnerable 
to deliberate contamination.  WHO recommends that restaurants monitor their 
condiments in open containers and salad bars for contamination.  WHO also cautions that 
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vending machines are vulnerable.  WHO also recommends reducing access to biological 
organisms that can be used in bioterrorism (WHO, 2008). 
WHO acknowledges that, in some cases where food products from small 
farms are combined and individual identification of the source is lost, it is difficult to 
trace and recall contaminated products from the market.  However, these tracing and 
market recall mechanisms must work quickly and accurately to protect people before the 
exposure becomes widespread (WHO, 2008). 
Surveillance, preparedness, and response.  Sometimes prevention does 
not work.  Even if prevention proved to be entirely adequate, there would still be hoaxes 
which would have to be addressed as if they were real.  The WHO breaks down their 
response strategy into three parts:  surveillance, preparedness, and response (WHO, 
2008). 
Surveillance.  Before a response to bioterrorism can be executed, the act 
must first be detected.  The detection system must be rapid and sensitive enough to 
identify small clusters of illnesses.  WHO recommends that existing foodborne disease 
surveillance systems be improved and recommends that clinicians, laboratories, and 
public health officers work closely for early disease detection.  WHO also encourages 
monitoring of school or workplace absenteeism and unusually high demands for certain 
medication that might indicate a bioterrorism attack, such as drugs that are effective 
against nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea (WHO, 2008). 
Preparedness.  WHO believes that preparedness includes the following:  
participants who would be involved in a bioterrorism response knowing their roles and 
responsibilities and being trained and evaluated on their performance, surveillance 
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systems in place and able to detect a bioterrorism attack, planning and exercises to test 
the effectiveness of the plans, vulnerability assessments, ability to investigate and 
confirm an incident, and effective communication between the applicable government 
agencies and other organizations that are involved with the bioterrorist attack (WHO, 
2008). 
Response.  WHO defines response as “all measures to identify, contain 
and minimize the impact of a food terrorist incident” (WHO, 2008:11).  WHO believes 
that the “response to food terrorism depends on awareness of the possibility of a terrorist 
act and recognition of the incident as involving food” (WHO, 2008:26).  WHO points out 
that an essential part of a bioterrorism response is the identification, tracking, and recall 
of contaminated food and stresses that, because the goal of the terrorists might be to 
cause people to become afraid and panic, the government and the industry need to be able 
to communicate timely and well with the people.  Also, the ability to communicate well 
could even dissuade terrorists from conducting attacks (WHO, 2008). 
International Legislation.  There are several international agreements 
that affect how we would respond to a foodborne bioterrorist attack from food imported 
from Mexico into the US.  These include the Codex Alimentarius, the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
In 1963, the United Nations’ (UN’s) Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) and WHO created the Codex Alimentarius Commission in an effort “to develop 
food standards, guidelines and related texts such as codes of practice” with the purpose of 
“protecting health of the consumers and ensuring fair trade practices in the food trade, 
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and promoting coordination of all food standards work undertaken by international 
governmental and non-governmental organizations” (WHO, 2010b).  The World Trade 
Organization recognizes the Codex Alimentarius as an international reference point to 
resolve food safety and consumer protection disputes.  Besides covering food labeling, 
food additives, contaminants, pesticides, risk assessment, and food hygiene, the Codex 
Alimentarius also covers methods of analysis and sampling along with import and export 
inspection and certification. 
Two international agreements came from the Codex Alimentarius.  The 
SPS Agreement, which became effective in 1995, allows the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) to limit the policies of its members relating to food safety, including bacterial 
contaminants, labeling, and inspection in an effort to restrict trade as little as possible.  
The SPS does not allow national quarantine policies to be used as a technical trade barrier 
to limit foreign imports.  Additionally, the SPS requires a country to scientifically 
demonstrate that a food is dangerous before it can be regulated.  Both of these limitations 
could prevent the US from acting quickly to respond to a bioterrorist threat (Buckley 
2010; WTO, 2010). 
The TBT Agreement is closely linked to the SPS with both going into 
effect in 1995 and having similar goals.  The WTO produced the TBT in an effort to 
make sure that technical regulations, standards, testing, and certification procedures 
would not create unnecessary obstacles to limit world trade. The TBT prohibits the 
creation and enforcement of technical requirements for the sole purpose of limiting 
imports.  In accordance with the TBT, the WTO’s most-favored-nation rule binds 
countries’ technical requirements, meaning in our case that the US may not subject 
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Mexico to higher tariffs or lower import quotas, for example, than any other country with 
most-favored-nation status, like Canada.  Also, the TBT encourages countries to 
recognize the results of other countries' conformity assessment tests, which are the tests 
that determine if a product conforms to an agreed on standard.  The goal is to have 
international standards (WTO, 2010). 
NAFTA is an agreement between Canada, Mexico, and the US designed 
to eliminate all barriers of trade and investment between the three countries.  Upon its 
implementation on 1 January 1994, NAFTA immediately eliminated most trade tariffs 
from US imports from Mexico.  Those tariffs that were not immediately eliminated were 
scheduled to be phased in to include all tariffs.  Within ten years, all tariffs were 
eliminated with the exception of US exports to Mexico of corn, dry edible beans, nonfat 
dry milk, and high fructose corn syrup and Mexican exports to the US of sugar and 
certain horticultural products.  On 1 January 2008, the final provisions of NAFTA were 
fully implemented (FAS, 2008). 
US Government Plan 
National Response Framework.  The National Response Framework, or 
NRF, outlines how the US responds to disasters and emergencies, including acts of 
bioterrorism (FEMA, 2008).  The NRF consists of a core document with Emergency 
Support Function Annexes, Support Annexes, Incident Annexes, and Partner Guides.  
“Emergency Support Function (ESF) Annexes” gather national capabilities and resources 
into areas which serve the same function.  For example, ESF #11 is Agriculture and 
Natural Resources, which is what would be used in the incidence of foodborne 
bioterrorism. 
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“Support Annexes” explain important supporting characteristics that are 
applicable to all incidents.  During an emergency, many administrative functions and 
procedures are necessary to ensure effective and efficient incident management.  These 
include critical infrastructure and key resources, financial management, international 
coordination, private-sector coordination, public affairs, tribal relations, volunteer and 
donations management, and worker safety and health (FEMA, 2008). 
The “Incident Annexes” cover the unique characteristics of the response to 
seven incident categories.  The three Incident Annexes that are used in a foodborne 
bioterrorism incident are the Biological Incident Annex, the Food and Agriculture 
Incident Annex, and the Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Incident 
Annex (FEMA, 2008). 
“Partner Guides” are four guides that provide federal, state, local, and 
private-sector responders a ready reference to the areas covered by the NRF and its 
supporting annexes.  For example, local emergency managers can use the Local 
Government Partner Guide to find their roles and responsibilities during an incident and 
that page 16 of the NRF provides more information (FEMA, 2008). 
For each annex, the NRF designates a “coordinating agency” that 
implements the actions contained in the annex.  The agencies selected as the coordinating 
agencies are those that can provide the leadership and expertise specific to that function 
or incident.  For example, the USDA would be the coordinating agency for a food and 
agriculture incident.  “Cooperating agencies” are those that have specific capabilities and 
knowledge that can assist the coordinating agency.  For example, the Department of 
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Health and Human Services (HHS) might be a cooperating agency in the food and 
agriculture incident if it affected the health of humans (FEMA, 2008). 
Response.  State and local governments are primarily responsible to detect 
the outbreak and to implement actions to mitigate the consequences of the attack.  The 
outbreak is usually first recognized when there is a significantly increased number of 
people that become sick and are admitted to hospital emergency rooms.  Sometimes, 
routine laboratory surveillance or inspections may first detect the foodborne pathogen.  
Initially, the foodborne bioterrorist attack may be impossible to differentiate from a 
naturally occurring biological outbreak and may take many days until it is identified.  
Laboratories identify, confirm, and characterize the biological agent to make sure that the 
appropriate medical interventions are used in a timely manner (FEMA, 2008). 
Upon the determination by the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) that there is reason to believe that a bioterrorism incident has taken place 
requiring a coordinated federal response, he or she would likely activate ESF #8 (Public 
Health and Medical Services Annex), ESF #11 (Agriculture and Natural Resources 
Annex), all Support Annexes, and the Biological, Food and Agriculture, and Terrorism 
Incident and Law Enforcement and Investigation Incident Annexes (FEMA, 2008).  
While the HHS is the federal government’s primary agency for response to a bioterrorist 
attack, the USDA is the federal government’s primary agency for attacks that occur in 
animals used in the commercial production of food and on food processing/slaughtering 
facilities under its regulatory jurisdiction.  Because the Secretary of DHS is the principal 
federal official for domestic incident management and is overall responsible for 
coordinating federal operations in response to a terrorist attack, he would have to 
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determine whether HHS or USDA serve as the Coordinating Agency.  The Department of 
State, Department of Justice, DHS, and possibly up to 12 others would serve as 
Cooperating Agencies (FEMA, 2008). 
Once HHS has been notified of the outbreak and has determined that it is a 
bioterrorism incident, it notifies the appropriate agencies and convenes a meeting of those 
belonging to ESF #8 (Public Health and Medical Services Annex) to assess the situation 
and determine the correct medical actions.  DHS coordinates overall federal support that 
is not medical with the DHS Office of Public Affairs coordinating all federal public 
announcements and press releases.  The Department of State communicates with 
international organizations, such as the WHO, and coordinates all foreign assistance 
(FEMA, 2008). 
HHS assists state and local public health and medical authorities and 
provides surveillance recommendations.  Starting at the local level and expanding as 
needed, the public health system protects the population from further effects of the 
outbreak.  The agencies work together to determine the source of the foodborne pathogen 
and how it was spread, determine treatment, determine how the attack would affect 
domestic and international issues, control and contain the spread of the contaminated 
food, support the impending increase of medical services needs, identify the cause of the 
illnesses, and prevent the further spread of disease by removing the contaminated food 
from the public by recall (FEMA, 2008). 
Once the USDA has been notified that the outbreak is from a foodborne 
pathogen, it notifies the appropriate agencies and convenes a meeting of those belonging 
to ESF #11 (Agriculture and Natural Resources Annex) to help ensure the safety and 
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security of the commercial food supply.  The USDA supports state and local authorities 
and other federal agencies to ensure that the nation’s supply of meat, poultry, and egg 
products is safe and secure.  HHS’ FDA has statutory authority over all other food.  The 
USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service, or FSIS, conducts foodborne disease 
surveillance and coordinates the tracing, recall, and disposal of contaminated food.  
USDA also provides inspectors and laboratory services to the affected areas, including 
food processing plants, to make sure that only safe and wholesome food products enter 
commerce.  FSIS District and Field Offices throughout the country coordinate field 
response activities with the headquarters at the National Response Coordination Center 
(FEMA, 2008). 
The CDC investigates once an outbreak is strongly suspected (CDC, 
“Frequently”, 2005). They search for other cases of infected people among those who 
may have been exposed to the same infected food.  The outbreak is described by time, 
place, and person.  Investigators interview those sick in an effort to identify the food item 
causing the sickness.  If any of the suspected food item remains, it is tested for infection.  
The investigators seek to make a statistical association between the infected people and 
the suspected food.  The outbreak ends when the exposure ends.  Thomas Rothwell of the 
Center for Army Analysis agrees that “once an outbreak occurs, the creation of a quality 
epidemiological investigation team is a key element in determining the factors and 
mechanisms that contributed to the illness.  It is imperative that local officials ask for the 
appropriate assistance if necessary” (Rothwell, 2004:16).  If we understand how the 
infection is transmitted and where it has been distributed, investigators can work to 
confine or eliminate the outbreak.  The investigation works best when criminal 
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investigators working for a conviction, intelligence investigators gathering information 
on a terrorist organization, and health care investigators working to stop the outbreak and 
treat patients, cooperate. 
DHS coordinates with HHS, USDA, and state and local officials 
concerning public announcements and press releases to make sure that communications 
with the public are timely, consistent, and accurate.  The messages are designed to relieve 
anxieties, ease needless concerns, and solicit cooperation with needed actions (FEMA, 
2008). 
Up to this point, the discussion has focused on the medical and 
agricultural aspects of the bioterrorism attack.  There is also the criminal investigation 
and attribution aspects of the attack which need to work with all other aspects of the 
bioterrorist incident.  The Attorney General acts through the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, or FBI, to investigate terrorist acts within the US and to coordinate the 
activities of other members of the law enforcement community.  After taking actions to 
preserve life, minimizing the risks to health, and preventing the bioterrorist act from 
being expanded or aggravated, law enforcement and investigative officials seek to 
apprehend and successfully prosecute the perpetrators of the bioterrorism.  Perhaps one 
of the most important pieces of the criminal investigation is the collection of evidence.  
The FBI coordinates with the HHS’ Laboratory Response Network which tests collected 
samples for the presence of the biological agent.  A law enforcement chain of custody is 
established and maintained with original samples sent to HHS’ CDC.  The FBI forms a 
command post called a Joint Operations Center, or JOC.  At the JOC, law enforcement 
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officials gather information for collection, analysis, dissemination, and storage.  The 
investigative personnel collect and manage investigative information (FEMA, 2008). 
New Federal Legislation.  On 30 November 2010 the US Senate passed 
(73 for to 25 against with two abstaining) a bill (S.510:  FDA Food Safety Modernization 
Act) to improve the safety of the US food supply by providing new powers and resources 
to the FDA.  The US House of Representatives passed this act, by the same name under 
H.R. 2751, by a vote of 215 for and 144 against on 22 December 2010.  The President 
signed the bill into law on 4 January 2011.  The $1.4 billion bill will make several 
changes in food production operations.  First, the FDA will be allowed to order a recall of 
contaminated food instead of the current power to only be able to negotiate with 
companies to order voluntary recalls.  Second, large food producers and manufacturers 
will be required to register with the FDA and provide them with detailed food safety 
plans.  Third, the FDA will be required to establish new produce safety regulations for 
those companies providing the highest risk fruits and vegetables.  Fourth, there will be 
stricter standards for imported food.  Fifth, there will be more inspections of foreign and 
domestic food facilities with increased attention on those companies with higher risk 
profiles.  Because the USDA regulates meat, poultry, and processed eggs, this bill will 
not affect these food items (Associated Press, 2010; Library of Congress, 2010). 
A State Plan:  The State of Ohio 
The purpose of the Ohio Emergency Operations Plan, or EOP, is to ensure “the 
prompt and efficient deployment of state-level emergency response and recovery 
resources” (Ohio EMA, 2009:BP-12) in an effort to maintain the health, safety, and 
welfare of those affected by state-level emergencies.  The EOP is aligned with the 
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National Response Framework in its organization including its 15 Emergency Support 
Functions, or ESFs.  The Ohio Emergency Management Agency, or EMA, coordinates 
the emergency management activities of all state agencies.  Under the EOP, the priorities 
are first to save lives, then to stabilize the incident, then finally to preserve property.  The 
State of Ohio Emergency Operations Center, or SEOC, is a permanent facility located in 
the state capitol of Columbus and contains fifty-two work stations that can accommodate 
one hundred and four emergency response workers.  The Executive Director of the SEOC 
notifies and activates primary and support agencies.  The state conducts operations in 
four phases:  mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery (Ohio EMA, 2009). 
State emergency response resources and assistance can be requested by local 
authorities only after all local resources are exhausted or inadequate.  When this occurs, 
the Governor can declare a state of emergency.  This declaration will activate state 
resources.  When the emergency exceeds the capabilities of the state, the Ohio EMA will 
contact FEMA Region V in Chicago, Illinois, to alert them that the Governor will be 
submitting a formal request for federal assistance (Ohio EMA, 2009). 
In the event of a bioterrorism attack, the state ESFs most likely to be activated are 
ESF#8 (Public Health and Medical Services), ESF#11 (Food and Agriculture), and the 
Terrorism Incident Annex.  The Ohio Department of Health, or ODH, is the Primary 
Agency for ESF#8 while the Ohio Department of Agriculture, or ODA, is the Primary 
Agency for ESF #11.  ODH has a central office in Columbus and four district offices.  
Ohio also has one hundred and thirty-six local health districts.  In the event of a 
foodborne bioterrorist attack, ODH would support the local health districts by providing 
health related services and supplies.  ODA would coordinate the inspections of food 
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establishments, ensure the safety and efficacy of foods they regulate, inspect food 
processing facilities and distributors, collect and analyze food samples, and coordinate 
and oversee the destruction of contaminated products (Ohio EMA, 2009). 
As part of the EOP, the Terrorist Incident Annex applies to specific terrorist acts 
and operations that include biological events.  It identifies, among other sites, 
“agricultural and food production, including farms, auction markets/concentration yards, 
and processing, slaughter, storage and distribution sites/facilities” (Ohio EMA, 
2009:TIA-4) as potential targets for terrorism.  Of the eleven essential capabilities that 
the annex addresses, four of them would directly relate to biological terrorism:  
epidemiological surveillance and investigation, food and agriculture safety and defense, 
laboratory testing, and response and decontamination.  The Ohio Homeland Security, or 
OHS, and the Ohio State Highway Patrol, or OSHP, would share as the Primary Agencies 
with thirteen other state departments as potential Supporting Agencies.  Once an act of 
bioterrorism affected Ohio, the SEOC would become operational and the Governor 
would identify the State Coordinating Officer to work with federal agencies such as 
FEMA (Ohio EMA, 2009).   
ODH would lead the epidemiological surveillance and public health investigation 
efforts, working with law enforcement, to identify the source of disease.  ODH would 
also make public health recommendations for intervention.  ODH would compile and 
analyze surveillance data, use pattern recognition to detect the suspected outbreak, and 
maintain a chain of custody of evidentiary materials.  The epidemiological investigation 
would include public health or agricultural investigators examining the location of the 
suspected outbreak and victims involved to identify the exposure and the disease 
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involved.  Samples would be taken to state laboratories for identification and analysis 
with control measures being recommended.  Finally, the spread and containment of the 
outbreak would be monitored (Ohio EMA, 2009). 
ODA, ODH, and the Ohio Department of Natural Resources, or ODNR, share the 
lead for the food and agriculture safety and defense capability.  In the event of a 
foodborne bioterrorism attack, these departments would provide food safety laboratory 
and diagnostic support and technical assistance due to their subject matter expertise.  
These lead departments, with several supporting departments, would direct food and 
agriculture inspectors to the locations of the suspected contamination and coordinate a 
variety of food and agriculture operations.  This would include the preservation of food 
and agriculture evidence; food and agricultural recovery; food processing, cleaning, and 
decontamination; and contaminated food disposal.  These state departments would 
conduct epidemiological investigations, actively search for possible food contamination, 
conduct food safety laboratory detection screening and confirmation, disseminate these 
results to appropriate personnel, and maintain a chain of custody for all associated 
evidence.  They would also conduct product tracing to determine the source, destination, 
and disposition of contaminated food and identify those populations and locations at risk.  
Through product recall, administrative detention, and plant closures, the state would 
control the contaminated food products at the facilities suspected of being contaminated 
(Ohio EMA, 2009). 
ODA, the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, or OEPA, ODH, and the Ohio 
National Guard, or ONG, serve as lead state departments and agencies for the laboratory 
testing capability.  The Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team is part of the 
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ONG and are able to rapidly arrive at locations of contamination and assist first 
responders in biological identification and provide medical and technical advice.  The 
lead state departments would, in the event of food bioterrorism, direct the laboratory 
testing of the samples and specimens collected and report the results.  They would 
immediately notify the appropriate public health, agriculture, public safety, and law 
enforcement officials of presumptive and confirmed laboratory results of a biological 
threat agent (Ohio EMA, 2009). 
ODH, OEPA, and ODA would serve as the lead for the hazardous materials 
response and decontamination capability.  These state departments and agencies would 
conduct the decontamination operations following a food bioterrorism attack.  All 
facilities involved with the contaminated food would be considered contaminated itself 
until after proper decontamination (Ohio EMA, 2009). 
Inspection and regulation 
To make sure that the foods we buy are safe to eat, the food is inspected by the 
producer, the retailer, the state food safety department, the Food Safety and Inspection 
Service (FSIS) of the USDA, and most importantly, by the consumer.  While a 
consumer’s inspection is usually visual, the other inspectors are able to take more precise 
measurements in an effort to detect for foodborne pathogens.  However, there are two 
facts about food inspection.  First, inspectors cannot inspect safety into our food.  Second, 
even with the best inspection system available, inspectors would not be able to 
completely eliminate the risk of biological contamination in our food.  Even the most 
rigorous food safety programs will not guarantee food safety if they are not properly 
implemented and managed (Buckley, 2010). 
61 
 
Because nearly every regulatory food safety measure is applied at the food 
processing phase (Buckley, 2010), much effort has been focused on food producers.  
Food producers are in the food business to make money; therefore, to gain their 
compliance to food regulations, food producers must be persuaded that there is economic 
benefit (Buckley, 2010).  Using a carrot and stick method, all those along the food 
production chain must be convinced of the benefits of safe food and the increased cost of 
producing or selling contaminated food.  The continuance of business based upon return 
customers should encourage more sampling, as needed, as incentive enough, while the 
lack of business due to bad press, etc., following the sale of food contaminated with 
foodborne pathogens should serve as a deterrent.  Regulators could also deter 
noncompliance with the threat of more frequent inspection and fines (Buckley, 2010). 
Not all inspection programs are managed equally, not even within the US federal 
government.  It is interesting to note a finding of the HHS’ Inspector General that 
facilities under USDA/FSIS jurisdiction that process meat, poultry and processed eggs 
are constantly inspected, while less than half of those facilities under FDA jurisdiction 
that process seafood, fruits and vegetables, cheese, and bakery products were inspected 
even once between 2004 and 2008 (Buckley, 2010:17; HHS, 2010b). 
Different countries do not share the same standards of food production.  This is 
apparently the case between the US and Mexico.  Due to this, the rate of foodborne 
illness outbreaks in the US has increased since the North American Free Trade 
Agreement took effect in 1994 (Buckley, 2010). 
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How an Outbreak is Investigated 
All foodborne outbreaks should be investigated as rapidly as possible to discover 
the source of the outbreak and properly treat the infected and prevent any additional 
infections.  The Surgeon General of the Army and the US Army Medical Center and 
School (Dembeck, et al., 2007) provide the following ten steps to follow in investigating 
an outbreak.  Note that these steps may not occur in order. 
Ten Steps in an Outbreak Investigation (Dembeck, et al., 2007:43) 
1.  Prepare for fieldwork. 
2.  Verify the diagnosis.  Determine an outbreak exists. 
3.  Define the outbreak and seek a diagnosis. 
4.  Develop a case definition and identify and count cases. 
5.  Develop exposure data with respect of person, place, and time. 
6.  Implement control measures and continually evaluate them. 
7.  Develop the hypothesis. 
8.  Test and evaluate the hypothesis with analytical studies and refine the hypothesis. 
9.  Formulate conclusions. 
10.  Communicate findings. 
Step 1.  Prepare for field work.  To conduct an investigation, the 
necessary personnel, equipment, and laboratory capabilities must be ready.  Personnel 
must be trained and equipment must be functioning properly.  Communications must be 
established prior to the investigation. 
Step 2.  Verify the diagnosis.  Determine an outbreak exists.  This is 
where the actual investigation starts.  At the onset of the investigation, the magnitude of 
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the outbreak is usually unknown.  That is why existing surveillance information and 
increased surveillance efforts are used to determine if this event is truly an outbreak of 
concern. 
Step 3.  Define the outbreak and seek a diagnosis.  Historical, clinical, 
epidemiological, and laboratory information is gathered so that a diagnosis can be 
created. 
Step 4.  Develop a case definition and identify and count cases.  The 
case definition includes the laboratory and clinical features that is common to all infected 
people.  These features should be as objective as possible, such as a certain temperature 
of fever.  Defining the cases allows the investigator to count cases and make comparisons 
between those infected and those who are healthy.  Patients, family members, peers, and 
others are interviewed to obtain the necessary information.  Important information 
includes date of illness, symptoms, contact information for others to be interviewed, and 
medical care provided.  At this point, an epidemic curve can be created from which 
information about the outbreak can be extrapolated. 
Step 5.  Develop exposure data with respect of person, place, and time.  
Now that the cases have been identified, exposure information based upon person, 
location, and time is determined.  A case control study is made by comparing infected 
and well persons potential exposures or risk factors for disease. 
Step 6.  Implement control measures and continually evaluate them.  
Control measures, such as closing a suspected restaurant or a product recall, are taken to 
limit the spread of the infection and should be taken quickly and modified as more 
information becomes available. 
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Step 7.  Develop the hypothesis.  A hypothesis of how the outbreak 
occurred, from what food source it is spreading, and the risk to uninfected people is 
made.  The hypothesis is based on the characteristics of the disease and the infected 
people. 
Step 8.  Test and evaluate the hypothesis with analytical studies and 
refine the hypothesis.  Once a hypothesis is developed, data is collected to see if it 
supports this hypothesis or not.  If not, the hypothesis may be refined.  Based upon the 
hypothesis, the control measures from step 6 may need to be modified. 
Step 9.  Formulate conclusions.  In this step, conclusions are made 
concerning the nature of the disease and the route of exposure. 
Step 10.  Communicate findings.  Findings are communicated through 
the media or other publications based upon the urgency of the notification to the public 
and medical personnel. 
See Figures 8 and 9 that pictorially depict the sequence of investigating and reporting 
foodborne outbreaks.  Figure 10 shows how the 2008 Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak was 
investigated. 
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Figure 8.  Investigating Foodborne Outbreaks (CDC, “Foodborne Outbreak”, 2011a) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.  Avenues for Reporting Foodborne Illnesses (DeWaal, et al., 2011). 
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Figure 10.  Salmonella Saintpaul Outbreak Traceback and Distribution (FDA, 2008). 
 
 
Education 
We may not be able to completely stop bioterrorism, but the public could learn 
safe food handling and preparation practices to mitigate any effects a bioterrorism attack 
might have.  This leads to education of the public.  It could be argued that consumers 
have the least understanding about their role in food safety and that few of them 
understand fully that the foods they consume can make them sick and that they must 
assist in their food’s safety (Buckley, 2010).  This is relevant especially for young 
consumers who may lack even the basic skills required to cook their food. 
So, how do you educate the public?  The American Academy for Microbiology, 
or the Academy, recommends that “research aimed at designating and disseminating 
effective educational resources about safe food handling practices and the risks from 
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consuming tainted food is the key to reducing the risk of foodborne illness caused at the 
consumer level” and that this education should start “from youth onward” (Buckley, 
2010:23).  The Academy recommends that the fundamentals of safe food handling should 
be taught in school, especially in elementary and middle schools before the children are 
old enough to develop bad habits (Buckley, 2010).  They recommend that food safety 
could be taught in health, science, and home economics classes. 
Now, how do you educate adults?  The Academy recommends providing food 
safety information in a variety of places where adult consumers would find the 
information.  This includes in magazines, during talk shows and cooking shows, in social 
networking tools like Facebook, on youTube videos, in day care centers, at church 
suppers, at health care providers, in children’s television shows, at local health 
departments, and in store displays (Buckley, 2010). 
People will make their own determinations as to whether or not to follow these 
food safety recommendations.  Governments and public health organizations can make 
the information available, but they cannot control the behavior of the consumer (Buckley, 
2010). 
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III.  Methodology 
While many countries provide food to the US, this study is limited to food 
imported from Mexico into the US.  Much of the research was conducted by a literature 
review.  This includes how different levels of government and organizations plan, 
prepare, and respond to the threat of bioterrorism.  For information not found in 
published documents, organizations or experts in that particular field were contacted 
directly. 
The beginning of this process is the Mexican farms.  By tracing the path from our 
supermarkets and restaurants back to Mexico, I discovered the route our food takes and 
identified vulnerabilities.  Analysis of these vulnerable points led to what I believe may 
be done to keep Americans safer. 
Contaminated food outbreaks occur naturally every year and are reported by 
sources such as the CDC, WHO, ProMED, and state health departments.  This study uses 
as many foodborne outbreaks in the US as could be found.  It should be pointed out that 
the list of outbreaks used in this study is not exhaustive and may even represent a small 
portion of the actual foodborne outbreaks.  However, the outbreak information presented 
should provide insight into some important characteristics of the different foodborne 
pathogens.  The outbreaks are listed in Appendix F, tabulated in Appendix G, quantified 
in the Literature Review chapter, and analyzed in the Results chapter. 
The objectives of this study are recommendations on what can be done to reduce 
or eliminate the threat of biological terrorism through deliberately-contaminated food 
imported from Mexico.  There are several options that can be taken.  See Figure 11 for a 
diagram of the range of options for change.  One option is to maintain the status quo or 
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make no changes.  This might be a recommendation if everyone is executing the correct 
actions in the exact way they need to and refraining from those actions that are either 
unnecessary or counterproductive.  
A second option that can be taken is to do less than what is being done now.  This 
can be completed by taking an activity that is currently being conducted and either 
decreasing that activity (for example, less inspections) or eliminating that activity (for 
example, no more inspections). 
A third option that can be taken is to do more than what is being done now.  This 
can be completed by increasing the frequency of an activity (for example, inspect every 
month instead of every year), increasing the quality of an activity (for example, inspect 
for three pathogens instead of just two), or add another activity that is currently not being 
conducted (for example, start inspecting). 
 
 
 
Figure 11.  Range of Options for Change. 
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IV.  Analysis and Results 
Food Production Process 
Vulnerable Points 
The American Academy for Microbiology, in its report on global food safety, 
viewed protecting food as a “systems approach” where the process, from agricultural 
production to consumer consumption, is a “continuous system”.  Points where 
contamination is possible are identified, procedures are implemented to identify 
violations in food safety practice, and farm workers are provided with resources, training, 
and incentives required to consistently apply those safe procedures (Buckley, 2010).  
“Everyone in the process must share the responsibility of maintaining an unbroken chain 
of safe practices” (Buckley, 2010:9) because, viewing the food production process as 
links in a chain, “if one link in the food production chain breaks and compromises the 
microbial safety of a food item, tainted food may make it all the way to a consumer’s 
table” (Buckley, 2010:33). 
Usually, the situations that are most vulnerable to deliberate contamination are 
those where food changes hands.  Also, the probability for deliberate contamination of 
food is likely to increase as it nears production and distribution.  However, the probability 
for greater morbidity and mortality usually increases as the contaminating biological 
agent is introduced closer to the point of consumption (WHO, 2008). 
The vulnerability of the food we eat starts at the very beginning of the food 
production process.  Contaminated water can be introduced to plants or animals as they 
grow and mature.  Bioterrorists can also inject pathogens directly into the plant or animal, 
including right before harvest or slaughter.  Infected animals often would become sick 
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and plants would rot or decay and lose their appeal, and food safety officers would have 
more time to detect the attack if it occurred this early in the process. 
One of the more vulnerable points in the food production process is when the food 
is being combined with other foods.  The addition of “extra” ingredients might go 
unnoticed.  Additionally, a food processing company must trust people to perform the 
operations that prepare the food for public consumption.  The greater the number of 
people with access to the processing food, the more vulnerable the food is to 
contamination. 
Food service is another point where food is vulnerable to deliberate contamination 
and has been used before in previous biological attacks in the US.  In both the 1984 
Rajneeshee Salmonella attack and the 1996 Shigella dysenteria contamination, stated in 
the “Previous Bioterrorist Attacks” section, the biological pathogen was added to the 
food (salad bar and pastries) right before consumption.  It is at the point of consumption, 
usually, where most of the controls put in place to protect the food from contamination 
are removed. 
Of all the phases in the food production process, one could argue that the one 
where the participants have the least understanding of their obligations in the safety of 
food is the consumers themselves (Buckley, 2010).  Failure to properly refrigerate or 
cook certain foods, unsanitary preparation surfaces or utensils, or failure to adequately 
clean fruits and vegetables could encourage growth of foodborne pathogens and cause 
illness.  However, once the consumer has purchased the food and brought it home, the 
food is now widely dispersed and usually there are better ways for terrorists, in this 
situation, to affect the individual people. 
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See Table 6 for a summary of vulnerabilities. 
 
Table 6.  Summary of Vulnerabilities 
Where food changes hands 
 
At the very beginning of the food production process 
 
When food is being combined at a food processing facility 
 
At food service 
 
At the consumer level 
 
 
 
Foodborne Pathogens 
Analysis of Previous Biological Outbreaks 
This study found that the four most frequent causes of foodborne outbreaks from 
1977 to 2010 were Salmonella, E. coli, Listeria, and C. botulinum.  As part of the 
analysis of Salmonella, the 1994 outbreak of ice cream contaminated with Salmonella 
enteritides, resulting in 224,000 infections, was sometimes ignored due to the large 
number of infections skewing the analytical results.  Analysis of these four organisms in 
Table 7 reveals the following findings. 
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Table 7.  Number of Outbreaks, Deaths, Deaths per Outbreak, Infections, and Infections per 
Outbreak for the Four Most Frequent Causes of Foodborne Outbreaks 1977-2010 (Appendix F) 
 Salmonella E. coli Listeria C. botulinum 
Outbreaks 17 10 13 11 
Deaths 7 5 105 2 
Average Number of 
Deaths per Outbreak 
0.4 0.5 8.1 0.2 
Infections 245,257 1,269 472 191 
Average Number of 
Infections per Outbreak 
(without 1994 
Salmonella outbreak) 
1329 
 
127 
 36 17 
Median Infections per 
Outbreak 183 39 21 8 
 
 
First, not only did Listeria cause the most deaths overall, it caused the largest 
average number of deaths for each outbreak, 8.1, compared to less than one for the other 
three organisms.  Outbreaks of Salmonella, E. coli, and C. botulinum may or may not 
result in one death.  However, when a Listeria outbreak occurs, expect people to die.  
While about one-third of the Listeria outbreaks result in no deaths, three other outbreaks 
have resulted in 16, 17, and 48 deaths.  See Figure 12. 
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Figure 12.  Average Number of Deaths per Outbreak for the Four Most Frequent Causes of 
Foodborne Outbreaks 1977-2010 (Appendix F) 
 
 
 
Second, the average Salmonella outbreak infected significantly more than the 
other three organisms with a median of 183 infections and with four outbreaks infecting 
more than one thousand.  See Figure 13.  Note that the number of infections is 
represented by a logarithmic scale, so Salmonella is two orders of magnitude, or one-
hundred times, that of E. coli.  Salmonella is responsible for the four largest outbreak 
infections in this study, nine of the ten largest outbreaks, and fourteen of the twenty-one 
largest outbreaks. 
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Figure 13.  Average Number of Infections per Outbreak for the Four Most Frequent Causes of 
Foodborne Outbreaks 1977-2010 (Appendix F) 
 
Figure 14 graphically displays the number of outbreaks per year for the four 
foodborne pathogens.  While Listeria and C. botulinum appear relatively constant with an 
outbreak appearing occasionally, Salmonella and E. coli appear to have greatly increased 
since 2006.  Figure 15 displays the total number of outbreaks by year.  Notice that it also 
indicates that foodborne outbreaks increased since 2006.  The large number of 
Salmonella outbreaks, with help from E. coli, causes this to occur. 
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Figure 14.  Number of Outbreaks per Year for Salmonella, E. coli, Listeria,                                         
and C. botulinum 1977-2010 (Appendix F) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15.  Total Number of Outbreaks per Year for the Four Most Frequent Causes of Foodborne 
Outbreaks 1977-2010 (Appendix F) 
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Case Fatality Rates 
The case fatality rate is the number of death for each infection displayed as a 
percentage.  The equation is as follows:   
Case Fatality Rate = (Number of Deaths / Number of Infections) x 100%   
While not all infected people are counted towards an outbreak (they do not seek 
medical attention, for example), this information may be helpful to the terrorist if the 
desired effect is the maximum number of deaths.  See Table 8 for the case fatality rates 
for the four foodborne pathogens in this study. 
 
Table 8.  Case Fatality Rates for the Four Most Frequent Causes of Foodborne Outbreaks 1977-2010 
(Appendix F) 
Case 
Fatality 
Rates 
Salmonella 
* 
E. coli Listeria C. 
botulinum 
Total 
Total  0.003% 0.394% 22.246% 1.047% 0.048% 
1977-2006 0.025% 0.290% 21.225% 1.136% 0.044% 
2007-2010 0.001% 0.855% 53.333% 0% 0.281% 
* Includes 1994 Samonella case. 
 
 
Figure 16 displays the results from Table 8.  It indicates that Salmonella very 
rarely causes a death.  Listeria, alternatively, takes a life for every five infected people. 
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Figure 16.  Case Fatality Rates for the Four Most Frequent Causes of Foodborne Outbreaks 1977-
2010 (Appendix F) 
 
 
 
In an effort to determine if the outbreaks are deadlier, the case fatality rates were 
divided into two groups.  About half of the outbreaks studied occurred from 2007 to 
2010, so this represents the more recent group.  The earlier group are those outbreaks that 
occurred from 1977 to 2006.  Efforts to break up the time period into more than two 
groups resulted in many time periods without a death, resulting in undefined numbers.  
The later group was compared to the earlier group and the total average in Figure 17.  
Salmonella and Listeria show an increase, suggesting that they are becoming deadlier, 
while E. coli and C. botulinum show a decrease, suggesting that they are becoming less 
deadly.  Note that in this study, none of the 15 infected people died from C. botulinum 
since 1978, so the case fatality rate for 2007-2010 is zero. 
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Figure 17.  Case Fatality Rates per Year Group for the Four Most Frequent Causes of Foodborne 
Outbreaks 1977-2010 (Appendix F) 
 
 
 
All of the outbreaks taken together demonstrate an increasing trend and that 
outbreaks are becoming deadlier.  See Figure 18. 
 
 
Figure 18.  Overall Trend in Case Fatality Rates per Year Group for the Four Most Frequent Causes 
of Foodborne Outbreaks 1977-2010 (Appendix F) 
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Increased Number of Outbreaks 
Figure 15 shows that there has been an increase in foodborne outbreaks.  The 
WHO (2002) observed that the incidence of salmonellosis, for example, has increased in 
the past 34 years on many continents.  The following are reasons why this study could 
show that the number of foodborne outbreaks is on the rise. 
The numbers in the study are flawed.  This study does not include all of the 
foodborne outbreaks since 1977.  The assumption made is that the outbreaks included in 
this study are substantially representative, both in number and in characteristics, so that 
accurate conclusions can be asserted, such as types of most frequent pathogens and 
outbreak frequency over time.  Several reputable sources agree with the overall statement 
that the occurrence of foodborne outbreaks is increasing (WHO, 2002; Colorado 
Department of Public Health and Environment, 2010).  Even though the CDC reported 
(“Trends”, 2011b) a 20% reduction in illnesses, its study only tracked five illnesses, one 
of which showed an increase, and reported relative rates of laboratory-confirmed 
infections, not number of outbreaks. 
There has been an improvement in reporting.  The surveillance system 
PulseNet, developed in 1995 following a large E. coli outbreak in 1993, significantly 
increased the ability of investigators to connect geographically-dispersed foodborne 
illnesses (DeWaal, et al., 2011).  Around the world, the average time from the start of an 
outbreak to its discovery decreased from 30 days in 1996 to 14 days in 2009 while the 
start of the outbreak to the start of public communication about the outbreak also 
decreased from 40 days to 19 days for the same time period (Ellison, 2010). 
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There has been a recent recognition of foodborne pathogens.  It was not until 
1982 when E. coli O157:H7 was first recognized as a human pathogen (Ecolab, 2011).  
Listeria monocytogenes has also only recently been recognized as a foodborne pathogen 
(CDC, “Listeriosis,” 2011c; WHO, 2002).  Tauxe (2002) has stated that as we have been 
able to control or eliminate well-established pathogens, new pathogens have emerged and 
then predominated. 
Foodborne pathogens have adapted.  The changes experienced by species of 
microorganisms can result in new pathogens.  These same changes can cause known 
pathogens to become more pathogenic or more survivable in the environment.  One of 
these changes may be resistance to human intervention such as antibiotic resistance (see 
Salmonella’s resistance to fluoroquinolones in Mlot, 2000). 
Change in consumer lifestyles.  There has been an increase in the number of 
people who eat out.  The USDA (ERS, 2004) estimated that Americans will increase 
spending at full-service restaurants and fast food chains by 18 and 6 percent, respectively, 
between 2000 and 2020.  This is based upon the changing demographics and lifestyles of 
Americans:  increase in income, increase in the average age, and decrease in the 
proportion of “traditional” households which spend less money per person on food away 
from the home.  Often, the speed of service provided by that teenager or college student 
at the fast food chain is no match for the safe food preparation provided by the mature 
mother or father preparing the family meal at home. 
Increase in population.  The US population has increased to 308,745,538 
(Census, 2010).  More people means that there are more people to become infected, even 
if the rate of infection remains the same. 
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Globalization of the food supply.  There was a time when the American 
consumer looked forward to the summertime for the wide variety of produce that was not 
available at other times of the year.  Now, this produce is available year round from 
countries with longer and unlimited growing seasons and from countries south of the 
equator with a growing season months before and after ours. With the increased number 
of countries importing food into the US and the lower standards of food processing, there 
is an increased probability that food will arrive infected.   
New pathogens have been introduced or reintroduced to the US.  Before 
1991, epidemic cholera had not been present in South America during the 1900s.  First 
Peru, then six other countries in the Americas, including 14 cases in the US, suffered 
outbreaks, perhaps resulting from reintroduction from Chinese shipping (CDC, 
“Epidemiologic Notes and Reports Listeriosis”, 1991; WHO, 2002). 
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V.  Findings, Recommendations, and Conclusion 
Introduction 
The Secretary of the USDA has often said words to the effect that America’s food 
supply is the most abundant, the safest, and one of the cheapest in the world (Glickman, 
2000).  This is especially true for a food supply that feeds 307 million people.  Also, 
despite the frequent natural biological outbreaks that occur, no act of bioterrorism has 
occurred that would warrant massive changes to the way we are currently operating.  I 
hesitate to recommend the creation of more governmental organizations, the granting of 
more power, or the legislation of stricter regulations or an increase in inspections.  There 
are enough people striving for these ends and I believe that much of that is either 
ineffectual or counterproductive.  We will never have a perfect system in place to prevent 
all acts of terrorism.  We cannot inspect everything for every pathogen and other 
contaminant at all stages of food production and processing.  My purpose here is to 
recommend some things that may not be said enough but that I believe would keep our 
food supply, and therefore us, safer.   
Findings and Recommendations 
As a nation, there are things we can do to prevent a foodborne attack from taking 
place.  The following are findings and recommendations from this study that we should 
do to prevent this attack. 
Finding #1:  Importing food from Mexico places American consumers at 
risk. 
Mexico is corrupt.  That corruption provides the opportunity for terrorists, 
including the drug cartels, to have access to the food that Americans eat.  The opportunity 
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for terrorists to contaminate our food supply is greater when the food travels a longer 
distance, crosses more borders, and changes more hands.  The US is dependent upon 
Mexico for some of the food that we eat, but we should not be that dependent.  
Americans are at a higher risk of a foodborne terrorist attack when the food comes from 
Mexico than if that same food were to be produced within the US. 
Recommendation #1:  Increase American food production.  
The US should increase its production of food with the goal of producing a self 
sufficient food supply.  The federal government, through the USDA, should encourage 
this agricultural growth by supporting the creation and maintenance of domestic markets 
and facilitate coordination of underserved communities where access to farmland is 
limited.  Local food producers should attempt to sell their food locally while consumers 
and food retailers (supermarkets, etc.) should buy local food first.  Consumers should 
grow produce in family fruit and vegetable gardens and raise livestock as they are able.  
The benefits of decreasing our dependence on imported food include fresher and safer 
food.  We may not be able to produce all of the varieties of food Americans enjoy in the 
US, such as cocoa beans used for chocolate, but we should import as little as possible.  If 
these efforts fail, the federal government, through the USDA, should limit the amount of 
food imported.  Currently, we cannot inspect as well as we would like because of the 
magnitude of imports crossing our borders daily.  If the amount of food coming into the 
US became small enough, we could inspect much better than now.  Identifying the source 
of the food grown, raised, and processed may be placed on the labels of the food product 
sold. Food in supermarkets may be segregated by country origin where all food products 
from Mexico, for example, would have its own section.  This would allow the consumer 
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to simply avoid the food from certain countries.  Information provided to the public is not 
a bad thing.  However, this may not be a good idea because this might increase the cost of 
food, limit the availability and variety of food, and consumers might not care or may 
even prefer imported food.   
The secondary effects of increasing US food production would be a decrease of 
exports from the farms in Mexico.  If the Mexican farms were not able to find another 
buyer of their products and if the trade shortfall caused the farmers’ business to become 
unprofitable, all those involved in the food production process would need to find a way 
to make up that shortfall in revenue.  As stated about Mexican corruption, this act could 
strengthen an already powerful drug cartel system.  Mass relocations of families to larger 
cities and perhaps across the US border could result.  The increase in American food 
production would have to be closely monitored so as to not threaten the security of the 
US and push a neighboring country over the edge of economic instability.   
Finding #2:  The consumer is the greatest vulnerability to the food 
production process.   
From the farm to the market and restaurant, food is usually well regulated by 
government agencies from the USDA, FDA, and state health departments.  Inspectors do 
not enter consumers’ houses and check to see if the food is stored or prepared properly.  
Also, there is no training or test to qualify to become a consumer.  The American 
consumer is the weakest link of the food production chain and is the greatest vulnerability 
to an act of bioterrorism. 
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Recommendation #2:  Better inform the consumer on food safety issues.   
This includes proper storage and preparation of food.  Most of the same safe food 
handling procedures that keep a consumer safe from natural biological outbreaks should 
provide protection from a bioterrorism attack using the same pathogen.  See the 
recommendations provided under “Education” at the end of the Literature Review 
chapter for a more complete description.  HHS and state and county health departments 
should use social networking media such as Facebook, widgets, blogs, Twitter, podcasts, 
mobile alerts, and online videos to get the information out. 
The intent of the actions contained in the above listed recommendations is to 
dissuade the terrorist from executing the foodborne attack.  If deterrence fails, we must be 
able to take responsive actions.  There are things we can do to respond to a foodborne 
attack that will mitigate or prevent damage.  The following are findings and 
recommendations from this study that we should do to respond to an attack. 
Finding #3a:  Quicker identification results in fewer infections.   
The shorter the lag time between symptoms and outbreak identification and 
treatment, the fewer people that will become infected and the more lives that will be 
saved.  The most important part of an investigation of a suspected foodborne outbreak is 
the identification (WHO, 2008).  Also shown previously, an E. coli outbreak that was 
detected in 18 days versus 39 days resulted in less than five percent of the illnesses and 
no deaths (Institute of Medicine, 2008). 
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Finding #3b:  Foodborne outbreaks have become deadlier and more 
frequent.   
The total number of foodborne outbreaks appear to have become deadlier and 
have increased in frequency, especially Salmonella and E. coli.  The pathogen of choice 
for the bioterrorist would be Salmonella for maximum infections and Listeria for 
maximum deaths. 
Recommendation #3:  Expand research in rapid identification.   
The ability to trace the route that food has taken though the entire food production 
process is essential for limiting foodborne infections during an outbreak.  Federal and 
state governments should fund research into further development of networks such as 
PulseNet, FoodNet, OutbreakNet, and ESSENCE.  Government agencies should meet 
with consumers and industry to better understand the food production processes that are 
currently being used and developed. 
Finding #4:  Investigators require some time to identify outbreaks.   
Following the ten steps in an outbreak investigation could take weeks of intense 
investigative work, especially if the outbreak covers a large geographic area with only a 
few infections from each state affected. 
Recommendation #4:  Increase public awareness of the importance of 
reporting illness.   
Consumers who become sickened by foodborne pathogens should report their 
sickness to the local health department.  This should occur even if the infected choose to 
treat the sickness at home instead of seeking medical attention at a hospital.  This 
additional information would alert public health agencies earlier of a bioterrorism attack.  
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HHS and state and county health departments should use social networking media and 
other means to educate the public.  Physicians and pharmacists should ascertain and 
report by name anyone who is infected. 
Conclusion 
There exists a thought that a deliberate attack with an engineered pathogen would 
be more devastating than a natural foodborne outbreak (see the WHO comment that “if 
the unintentional contamination of one food, such as clams, can infect 300,000 
individuals with a serious debilitating disease, then a concerted, deliberate attack could be 
devastating, especially if a more dangerous agent was used” WHO, 2008:7).  I disagree.  
I have demonstrated that terrorists have been unable to produce the infections or deaths 
caused by the largest natural foodborne outbreaks.  Rather, the real threat of a bioterrorist 
attack through deliberately-contaminated food supplied from Mexico, resulting in mass 
casualties or deaths, does not come from a biologically engineered microorganism, but 
from the pathogens that frequently cause foodborne outbreaks.  They have proven 
themselves to be able to survive through the food production process and arrive on our 
dinner tables despite our best efforts. 
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Appendix A.  Value of US Agricultural Imports by Year 
(ERS, 2010b) 
 
 
Year Value (in Millions of Dollars) 
1976  10,966 
1977  13,441 
1978  14,804 
1979  16,723 
1980  17,401 
1981  16,907 
1982  15,345 
1983  16,536 
1984  19,334 
1985  19,968 
1986  21,453 
1987  20,402 
1988  20,955 
1989  21,879 
1990  22,918 
1991  22,875 
1992  24,796 
 
Year Value (in Millions of Dollars) 
1993  25,117 
1994  27,024 
1995  30,255 
1996  33,511 
1997  36,148 
1998  36,894 
1999  37,673 
2000  38,974 
2001  39,366 
2002  41,915 
2003  47,384 
2004  53,989 
2005  59,291 
2006  65,326 
2007  71,913 
2008  80,488 
2009  71,699 
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Appendix B.  Estimated Annual Number of Episodes of Domestically Acquired, 
Foodborne Illness, Hospitalizations, and Deaths Caused by 31 Pathogens and Unspecified 
Agents Transmitted Through Food in the US 
(Scallan, et al., 2011) 
Cause    Illnesses % Hospitalizations  % Deaths  % 
Major known pathogens   9,388,075   20   55,961 44 1,351 44 
Unspecified agents 38,392,704   80   71,878 56 1,686 56 
Total 47,780,779 100 127,839               100 3,037   100 
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Appendix C.  Estimated Annual Number of Episodes of Domestically Acquired, 
Foodborne Illness, Hospitalizations, and Deaths Caused by 7 Major Pathogens 
Transmitted Through Food in the US 
(Scallan, et al., 2011) 
Pathogen    Illnesses Hospitalizations Deaths 
Norovirus 5,461,731 14,663 149 
Nontyphoidal Salmonella spp. 1,027,561 19,336 378 
Clostridium perfringens    965,958      438   26 
Campylobacter spp.    845,024    8,463   76 
Toxoplasma gondii      86,686    4,428 327 
Listeria monocytogenes        1,591    1,455 255 
E. coli O157      63,153    2,138   20 
 
Data were mostly from 2000-2008. 
All estimates were based on the 2006 US population of 299,000,000 people. 
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Appendix D.  Current List of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
(DOS, 2010b) 
 
“Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) are foreign organizations that are 
designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA), as amended. FTO designations play a critical role in our fight 
against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities 
and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business” 
(www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm). 
 
1. Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) 
2. Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 
3. Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMS) 
4. Al-Shabaab 
5. Ansar al-Islam (AAI) 
6. Asbat al-Ansar 
7. Aum Shinrikyo (AUM) 
8. Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) 
9. Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA) 
10. Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) 
11. Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) 
12. HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement) 
13. Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B) 
14. Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM) 
15. Hizballah (Party of God) 
16. Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) 
17. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 
18. Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) (Army of Mohammed) 
19. Jemaah Islamiya organization (JI) 
20. Kahane Chai (Kach) 
21. Kata'ib Hizballah (KH) 
22. Kongra-Gel (KGK, formerly Kurdistan Workers' Party, PKK, KADEK) 
23. Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT) (Army of the Righteous) 
24. Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ) 
25. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
26. Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) 
27. Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) 
28. Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) 
29. National Liberation Army (ELN) 
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30. Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) 
31. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) 
32. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 
33. PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC) 
34. al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) 
35. al-Qa’ida (AQ) 
36. al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
37. al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly GSPC) 
38. Real IRA (RIRA) 
39. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
40. Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N) 
41. Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) 
42. Revolutionary Struggle (RS) 
43. Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL) 
44. United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) 
45. Harakat-ul Jihad Islami (HUJI) 
46. Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 
47. Jundallah 
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Appendix E.  US Food Imports from Mexico for 2009 
(ERS, 2010b) 
 
 
Category Amount (in Millions of Dollars) 
edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers 3,151.10 
beverages, spirits and vinegar 2,333.90 
edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons 2,288.70 
sugars and sugar confectionery 905.40 
preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts, or other parts of plants 636.60 
preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; bakers' wares 605.40 
fish and crustaceans, mollusks and other aquatic invertebrates 430.90 
miscellaneous edible preparations 401.60 
cocoa and cocoa preparations 355.20 
coffee, tea, mate and spices 277.20 
pharmaceutical products 238.40 
meat and edible meat offal 134.80 
animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; 
prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes 69.60 
edible preparations of meat, fish, crustaceans, mollusks or other 
aquatic invertebrates 68.10 
dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey; edible products of 
animal origin 61.30 
oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and 
fruits; industrial or medicinal plants; straw and fodder 51.40 
lac; gums; resins and other vegetable saps and extracts 42.70 
milling industry products; malt; starches; inulin; wheat gluten 42.50 
tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes 22.70 
cereals 16.80 
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Appendix F.  Previous Biological Outbreaks 
 
 
Contaminated food outbreaks occur naturally every year.  The CDC, unless cited 
otherwise (CDC, “Outbreaks”, 2010h), reports the following outbreaks: 
Outbreak of Listeria Associated with Consumption of Chopped Celery.  Ten 
people in Texas became infected with Listeria from eating chopped celery processed by 
Sangar Fresh Cut Produce in October 2010.  Five people died (Texas Department of State 
Health Services, 2010). 
Salmonella Egg Recall of August 2010.  A Salmonella Enteritidis outbreak 
sickened 2,508 Americans in 23 states from 2 May to 31 August 2010.  The contaminated 
eggs were traced back to two egg farms in Iowa, which recalled about 550 million eggs 
from the US market (CDC, “Salmonella”, 2010i).  Because about 1,093 cases of 
Salmonella usually occur during this period, the CDC has lowered this estimate to about 
1,519 cases related to this outbreak (CDC, “Investigation Update”, 2010f). 
Outbreak of E. coli O145 Infections Linked to Shredded Romaine Lettuce.  
Twenty-six people in five states became ill with Escherichia coli O145 infection from 
eating contaminated shredded romaine lettuce processed by Freshway Foods in Sidney, 
Ohio, 1 March to 20 May 2010. 
Outbreak of E. coli O157:H7 Infections Associated with Beef from Fairbank 
Farms.  Twenty-six people from eight states were infected with matching strains of E. 
coli O157:H7 from ground beef from 17 September to 6 November 2009.  Approximately 
545,699 pounds of ground beef products were recalled.  Nineteen people were 
hospitalized with two deaths. 
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Outbreak of E. coli O157:H7 Infections Linked to Eating Raw Refrigerated, 
Prepackaged Nestle Toll House Cookie Dough.  Sixty-five people from twenty-nine 
states were infected with E. coli O157:H7 from eating raw refrigerated, prepackaged 
Nestle Toll House cookie dough 1 March to 18 June 2009 (CDC, “Multistate”, 2009a) 
Outbreak of Salmonella Saintpaul Infections Linked to Raw Alfalfa Sprouts.  
Two hundred and thirty-five people from fourteen states were infected with Salmonella 
Saintpaul from consuming alfalfa sprouts from 1 February to 15 April 2009.  Seven 
people were hospitalized. 
Outbreak of Salmonella Saintpaul Linked to Salsa.  One thousand four 
hundred and forty-two people from forty-three states were infected with Salmonella 
Saintpaul from consuming jalapeno peppers, serrano peppers, and/or tomatoes from 16 
April to 11 August 2008.  Two hundred and eighty-six people were hospitalized and two 
people died. 
Outbreak of Salmonella Litchfield Linked to Cantaloupe from Honduras.  
Fifty-one people from sixteen states were infected with Salmonella Litchfield from 
consuming cantaloupe from Honduras from 10 January to 10 March 2008.  Sixteen 
people were hospitalized. 
Outbreak of Salmonella Agona Linked to Cereal from Malt-O-Meal.  
Twenty-eight people from fifteen states were infected with Salmonella Agona from 
consuming breakfast cereals from Malt-O-Meal from 1 January to 10 April 2008.  Eight 
people were hospitalized. 
Outbreak of Listeria Associated with Consumption of Whittier Farms 
Pasteurized Milk.  Five people in Massachusetts were infected by Listeria 
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monocytogenes from consuming pasteurized milk produced by Whittier Farms in 
November 2007.  All five patients were hospitalized and three died from sepsis attributed 
to the infection (ProMED, 2008; NewsInferno, 2008). 
Outbreak of E. coli O157 Infections Linked to Topp's Brand Ground Beef 
Patties.  Forty people from eight states were infected by E. coli O157 from consuming 
ground beef patties from 5 July to 24 September 2007.  About 21.7 million pounds of 
frozen ground beef patties were recalled.  Of the thirty-three known ill persons, twenty-
one were hospitalized with no deaths.  
Outbreak of Botulism Associated with Canned Chili Sauce.  Eight people in 
three states were made ill from botulinum toxin from consuming hot dog chili sauce 
made by Castleberry’s Food Company from 29 June to 7 August 2007.  At least four of 
those sick were hospitalized (CDC, “Botulism”, 2007). 
Outbreak of Salmonella 4,[5],12:i:- Linked to Pot Pies from Banquet.  Two 
hundred and seventy-two people from thirty-five states were infected with Salmonella 
4,[5],12:i:- from consuming Banquet brand pot pies produced by the ConAgra Foods 
company from 1 January to 29 October 2007.  Sixty-five people were hospitalized. 
Outbreak of Salmonella Schwarzengrund Linked to Pet Food.  Sixty-two 
people from eighteen states were infected with Salmonella Schwarzengrund from contact 
with dry pet food produced by Mars Petcare US from 1 January to 4 September 2007.  
Ten people were hospitalized. 
Outbreak of Salmonella Wandsworth Linked to Snack Food.  Sixty-five 
people from twenty states were infected with Salmonella Wandsworth from consuming 
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Robert’s American Gourmet brand Veggie Booty, a snack of puffed rice and corn with a 
vegetable coating, from 1 January to 4 September 2007.  Six people were hospitalized. 
Outbreak of Salmonella Tennessee Linked to Peanut Butter.  Four hundred 
and twenty-five people from forty-four states were infected with Salmonella Tennessee 
from consuming Peter Pan and Great Value peanut butter from 1 August 2006 to 16 
February 2007.  Seventy-one people were hospitalized. 
Outbreak of E. coli O157 Infections Associated with Taco Bell November-
December 2006.  Seventy-one people from five states were infected by E. coli O157 
from consuming food from Taco Bell from 20 November to 6 December 2006.  Shredded 
lettuce was the most likely source of the outbreak.  Fifty-three people were hospitalized. 
Outbreak of Salmonella Typhimurium Linked to Tomatoes.  One hundred and 
eighty-three people from twenty-one states were infected with Salmonella Typhimurium 
from consuming contaminated tomatoes from restaurants from 14 September to 2 
October 2006.  Twenty-two people were hospitalized. 
Outbreak of E.coli O157:H7 Infections Associated with Consumption of 
Fresh Spinach.  One hundred and eighty-three people from twenty-six states were 
infected by E.coli O157:H7 from consuming fresh spinach from 19 August to 5 
September 2006.  Ninety-five people were hospitalized and one person died.  The FDA 
advised consumers to not eat fresh spinach or fresh spinach-containing products while 
one spinach company voluntarily recalled all of its fresh spinach-containing products.  
Outbreak of Listeria from an Unknown Origin in Virginia.  Five people in 
Virginia were infected by Listeria from an undetermined source from June to mid July 
2004.  (ProMED, 2004). 
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Outbreak of Botulism Type E Associated with Eating a Beached Whale.  
Eight people in western Alaska became ill from botulinum toxin type E from eating 
meals consisting of whale skin and blubber collected from an adult beached beluga whale 
that had been dead for several weeks 17 July 2002.  Five of the eight affected people 
were hospitalized (CDC, “Outbreak of Botulism”, 2003b). 
Outbreak of E. coli O157:H7 Infections Associated with Attendance at the 
1999 Washington County Fair, New York.  Seven hundred and eighty-one people 
attending the Washington County Fair in New York State were infected by E.coli 
O157:H7 from drinking contaminated water.  Seventy-one people were hospitalized and 
two people died (New York State Department of Health, 2000). 
Outbreak of Listeria Associated with Consumption of Bil Mar Foods Hot 
Dogs and Deli Meats.  Seventy-five people in fourteen states were infected with Listeria 
monocytogenes from consuming hot dogs and deli meats produced by Bil Mar Foods in 
early August 1998 to February 1999.  Seventeen people died including five miscarriages 
or stillbirths.  The CDC has called this the second largest Listeria outbreak in US history 
(Spake, 1999). 
Outbreak of E. coli O157:H7 Infections Associated with Consumption of 
Radish Sprouts.  About 8,000 children in Sakai City, Japan, became ill with Escherichia 
coli O157:H7 infection from eating contaminated radish sprouts prepared in school 
lunches in July 1996.  Some of the children died (WHO, 2008; Mermin and Griffin, 
1999). 
Outbreak of Salmonella enteritides Infections Associated with Consumption 
of Ice Cream.  Salmonella enteritides infected 224,000 people in 41 states from their 
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consumption of contaminated pasteurized liquid ice cream in 1994 (WHO, 2008; 
Hennesy, et al., 1996). 
Outbreak of Botulism Type E Associated with an Uneviscerated, Salt-Cured 
Fish Product.  Four people in New Jersey became ill from botulinum toxin type E from 
eating an uneviscerated salt-cured fish preparation in May 1992.  All four affected people 
were hospitalized (CDC, “Outbreak of Type”, 1992). 
Outbreak of Hepatitis A Associated with Consumption of Clams.  Nearly 
300,000 people in Shanghai, China, were infected with hepatitis A from contaminated 
clams in 1988.  This may have been the world’s largest foodborne outbreak (WHO, 2008; 
Halliday, et al., 1991). 
Outbreak of Restaurant-Associated Botulism Type B.  Thirty-two people in 
Vancouver, Canada, became ill from botulinum toxin type B from eating at the White 
Spot Restaurant between 26 July and 5 September 1985.  Seven affected people needed 
to be placed on ventilation (CDC, “Update”, 1985b). 
Outbreak of Salmonella Typhimurium Linked to Tainted Milk.  At least 
16,284 persons from six Midwestern states were infected with Salmonella Typhimurium 
from contaminated milk from Hillfarm Dairy in Melrose Park, IL, in March and April 
1985.  Four or five people died from being infected (Lecos, 1986). 
Outbreak of Listeria Associated with Consumption of Mexican-Style Cheese.  
One hundred and forty-two people in California were infected by Listeria monocytogenes 
from consuming Mexican-style cheese from 1 January to 14 July 1985.  Forty-eight 
people died (California, 2010; CDC, “Epidemiologic Notes and Reports Listeriosis”, 
1985a). 
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Outbreak of Botulism Type A in Peoria, Illinois.  Twenty-eight people in 
Peoria, Illinois, became ill from botulinum toxin type A from eating contaminated 
sautéed onions on a patty-melt sandwich 14-16 October 1983.  All affected people were 
hospitalized and 12 of those needed to be placed on ventilation (CDC, “Foodborne 
Botulism”, 1984). 
Outbreak of Botulism Type A in Clovis, New Mexico.  Thirty-four people in 
Clovis, New Mexico, became ill from botulinum toxin type A from eating contaminated 
food at a restaurant April 1978.  All affected people were hospitalized and two of those 
died (Mann, 1983). 
Outbreak of Botulism Type B Associated with Consumption of Hot Sauce.  
Fifty-nine people in Pontiac, Michigan, became ill from botulinum toxin type B from 
eating contaminated hot sauce made from improperly home-canned jalapeno peppers at a 
Mexican restaurant 31 March to 6 April 1977 (Terronova, 1978).  This was the largest 
incident of botulism food poisoning in the US. 
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Appendix G.  Summary of Previous Biological Outbreaks 
(From Appendix F) 
 
 
Year Food Died Infected Infection 
2010 duck eggs 1 63 Salmonella 
2010 fruit dessert 0 37 E. coli 
2010 frozen rodents 0 7 Salmonella 
2010 school food 0 15 Salmonella 
2010 bean sprouts 0 106 Salmonella 
2010 cheese 0 37 E. coli 
2010 ground beef 0 500 Salmonella 
2010 unknown 0 3 E. coli 
2010 celery 5 10 Listeria 
2010 eggs 0 1,519 Salmonella 
2010 lettuce 0 26 E. coli 
2009 green beans 0 3 C. botulinum 
2009 ground beef 2 26 E. coli 
2009 cookie dough 0 65 E. coli 
2009 alfalfa sprouts 0 235 Salmonella 
2008 green beans 0 4 C. botulinum 
2008 salsa 2 1,442 Salmonella 
2008 cantaloupe 0 51 Salmonella 
2008 cereal 0 28 Salmonella 
2007 milk 3 5 Listeria 
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2007 ground beef 0 40 E. coli 
2007 chili sauce 0 8 C. botulinum 
2007 pot pies 0 272 Salmonella 
2007 pet food 0 62 Salmonella 
2007 snack food 0 65 Salmonella 
2006 carrot juice 0 7 C. botulinum 
2006 peanut butter 0 425 Salmonella 
2006 lettuce 0 71 E. coli 
2006 tomatoes 0 183 Salmonella 
2006 spinach 1 183 E. coli 
2005 fermented salmon 0 4 C. botulinum 
2004 unknown 0 5 Listeria 
2002 turkey 7 46 Listeria 
2002 whale 0 8 C. botulinum 
2001 deli meat 0 16 Listeria 
2000 cheese 0 12 Listeria 
2000 turkey 4 21 Listeria 
1999 water 2 781 E. coli 
1998 hot dogs 17 75 Listeria 
1994 chocolate milk 0 45 Listeria 
1994 ice cream 0 224,000 Salmonella 
1992 fish 0 4 C. botulinum 
1989 shrimp 1 10 Listeria 
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1986 unknown 16 36 Listeria 
1985 at restaurant 0 32 C. botulinum 
1985 milk 4 16,284 Salmonella 
1985 cheese 48 142 Listeria 
1983 milk 4 49 Listeria 
1983 onions 0 28 C. botulinum 
1978 at restaurant 2 34 C. botulinum 
1977 hot sauce 0 59 C. botulinum 
TOTAL 119 247,210 
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